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ARTICLES
THE RHETORIC OF WAR: WORDS, CONFLICT,
AND CATEGORIZATION POST-9/11
Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in*
An atmosphere of crisis enhances the power, especially of the Exec-
utive Branch, to frame and shape the characterization, understanding,
and reality of conflict. This Article addresses the language, rhetoric, sta-
tus, and legality of “war” by examining the complexity of decision-mak-
ing for policy-makers in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. It does so by looking both inward, examining presi-
dential war rhetoric in the United States, and outward, analyzing the
experience of democratic states with the legal construct of “emergency”
and “war” under the relevant international human rights treaties.
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INTRODUCTION
Words are a source of immense power.  We use words not only to
communicate and express our thoughts, but also to shape thought itself.
Rhetorical power is a way of constituting the audiences to whom it is
addressed “by furnishing [listeners] with the very equipment they need to
assess its use—the metaphors, categories, and concepts of . . . dis-
course.”1  These rhetorical devices are not neutral, value-free tools.2
Rhetors select them, consciously or unconsciously, to fit their purposes
and to accord with their own, and their audience’s, values, worldview,
and perception of reality.3  Governments choose and utilize them care-
fully not only vis-a`-vis their own domestic audiences, but also to re-
present the status, values, and positioning of the state vis-a`-vis other
states, international institutions and organizations, and international and
transnational legal and political forums.
The notion of the neutrality of language is linked to the view of
human reason as “conscious, literal, logical, universal, unemotional, dis-
embodied, and serv[ing] self-interest.”4  One of the main attributes of
being human has traditionally been considered the ability to transcend
and overcome our emotions, make decisions, and take actions that are
based on disembodied logic.5  According to this long-held view, emo-
tions impede our ability to think and make decisions “rationally” and
must be constantly checked and controlled.6  Plato analogized the binary
approach of separating human reason and rationality from irrational emo-
tions to a chariot harnessed to two winged horses—one representing ra-
tional impulses and positive (i.e., moral) emotions and the other
representing negative or irrational emotions.  The chariot’s driver repre-
sents reason, which needs to prevail over the horses in order to steer the
soul in its search for truth.7  Yet, the strict binary separation between,
and juxtaposition of, rationality and emotion has been challenged by in-
sights from modern cognitive and brain research.8  Rather than seeing
emotions as undermining reason, we have come to regard them as play-
ing an essential role in how we, in fact, reason.9  Decision-making de-
1 JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 203 (1987).
2 See GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND: A COGNITIVE SCIENTIST’S GUIDE TO
YOUR BRAIN AND ITS POLITICS 13 (2009).
3 Id. at 15.
4 Id. at 2.
5 See JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE 9 (2009).
6 See id.
7 Id. at 9–10.
8 See, e.g., DAVID REDISH, THE MIND WITHIN THE BRAIN: HOW WE MAKE DECISIONS
AND HOW THOSE DECISIONS GO WRONG 133–34 (2013) (stating that the common horse and
rider analogy is misguiding, because “you are both the horse and the rider”).
9 JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 283–328
(1999); MICHAEL STOCKER & ELIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS 91–121 (1996).
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pends on complex interplay between reason and emotions.10  Our mind is
as much “unconscious, embodied, emotional, empathetic, metaphorical,
and only partly universal” as it is logical and disembodied.11  Language
gets its power because it works on both levels; and because “it is defined
relative to frames, prototypes, metaphors, narratives, images, and
emotions.”12
It is especially in light of these insights that the framing of a situa-
tion as a “problem,” “crisis,” “emergency,” or even “war,” as well as the
very identification of an aggregation of facts as comprising “a situation,”
become critical.  The framing of issues and outcomes significantly
shapes choices—whether pertaining to private decisions or to public pol-
icy.  Individuals use frames as interpretive emotional filters through
which they make sense of events around them and messages they re-
ceive.13  Framing filters serve as mental shortcuts in the process of deci-
sion-making, i.e., as cognitive heuristics.  Being “cognitive misers,”
individuals utilize shortcuts in order to minimize the effort involved in
processing information and to make decisions as expediently and pain-
lessly as possible.14  Moments of great consternation and upheaval, such
as those invoked by the imagery of war and violent crisis, are character-
ized by sudden, urgent, and often unforeseen events or situations that
require immediate action.  These moments accentuate the problems re-
lated to our ability to process information and evaluate complex situa-
tions.  Hence, such crises tend to lead to an even greater reliance on
heuristics as a means of countering the lack of sufficient time to properly
evaluate the situation.15  At the same time, reliance on framing as a
shortcut also means that whoever manages to control the framing of in-
formation greatly influences, and can manipulate, the interpretation and
meaning that recipients of that information are likely to attach to it.  How
these frames affect the legality and perception of governmental (in-
wardly) and state (outwardly) decision-making, and the consequences
such communicated frames have in terms of legality of state action, for
example, in the context of international humanitarian and human rights
law, is significantly under researched and little understood.
This Article addresses the language, rhetoric, status, and legality of
war by examining the complexity of decision-making for policy makers
10 LEHRER, supra note 5, at 9. R
11 LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 13. R
12 Id. at 15.
13 See LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 13. R
14 SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CUL-
TURE 37 (2007).
15 Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 5–8 (2000) (the effects of time pressure on the (inverse) rela-
tionship between perceived risks and perceived benefits of an activity).
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in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  We spe-
cifically apply insights from cognitive decision-making theory both to
domestic contexts and to the interaction of states on security issues post-
9/11.  Part I focuses on the role of the President of the United States as a
national choice architect.  The President’s use of the power of the bully
pulpit is the paradigmatic illustration of the Executive’s framing power.
This is so especially in the context of the extraordinary authority exerted
by the President in responding to exigency and crisis.  The analysis ad-
dresses presidential power beyond the formal corners of the Constitution
and incorporates a situated understanding of presidential influence on de-
termining the shape of threats to the nation.  It looks closely at the adop-
tion and adaptation of the language of emergency and war by presidents
as a significant political and legal tool.  Part II examines the positioning
of democratic states post-9/11, as they have adopted, adapted, and, on
occasion, rejected the language of war and emergency to respond to ter-
rorist threats.  We map the initial flirtation and embrace of war rhetoric
by states followed by a more recent positioning by the United States and
the United Kingdom that avoids deploying the terminology or status of
“wartime.”  We go on to chart the significant indeterminacy indicated by
the contradictory usage over time of the terminology and legal status
associated with emergency, derogation, and war.  Here, we examine what
such varied claims by democratic states mean in the war-emergency-nor-
malcy context, and the consequences that follow for state and interna-
tional accountability as states behave as if a war footing is operative,
while simultaneously claiming that the relevant legal thresholds have not
been crossed.  In conclusion, we assert that directing attention to the lan-
guage and formalities of executive and state positioning is critical to un-
derstanding the political actions of states, the articulation and
implementation of state responsibility for transgressions and violations of
domestic and international law, and to engagement with the form and
substance defining the legal status of conflict and crisis.
I. DOMESTIC CONTROL: THE PRESIDENT AS A CHOICE ARCHITECT
“Presidents address many audiences, but ‘the people’ are
always listening.  Skillful presidents not only adapt to
their audiences; they engage in a process of transforming
those who hear them into the audiences they desire.”16
The constitutional framework of checks and balances in the United
States recognizes the need for a vigorous presidential leadership and
16 KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DEEDS DONE IN WORDS:
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE GENRES OF GOVERNANCE 5 (1990). See also VANESSA B.
BEASLEY, YOU, THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC
(2011).
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power that are balanced by a system of presidential accountability to the
other branches of government as well as to the public at large.17  Many
competing accounts and theories exist as to the nature and scope of, and
limitations on, presidential powers.  A comprehensive understanding of
those accounts cannot be confined to the examination of the formal pow-
ers of the presidency as they are incorporated within the four corners of
the Constitution and supplemented by statutes and judicial precedents.
Indeed, the very essence of the modern president’s power—the “power
to persuade”—cannot be found as such in the constitutional text.18  This
power of persuasion is directed at the general public, at the other two
branches of government,19 and at the federal and state officials who are
charged with the implementation of policy.20
The language used in the framing of the relevant events and issues
(indeed, the language used to describe what the issues are and which of
them are, in fact, relevant) is not only shaped and informed by reality,21
it is, in and of itself, constitutive of what that reality may be.22  Rather
than being formed by, and discoverable through, exogenous situational
contexts, rhetoric precedes and informs the impact of such situations.23
Meaning “is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors.”24  In
the United States, no one plays the role of the national rhetorician more
than the President—“the nation’s chief storyteller, its interpreter-in-
chief.”25  Presidents, argues Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “respond to mo-
ments with words that tell us what the moments mean and then, with
words, recommend to the nation and to the Congress courses of ac-
tion.”26  While the Office of the President is continuously defined and
17 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 24–25. R
18 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 11 (1960).
19 See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEAD-
ERSHIP (4th ed. 2006).
20 See ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC
AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 27–33 (2009).
21 See Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154,
156 (1973).
22 See id.
23 Compare id. at 154, with Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETO-
RIC 1, 2 (1968) (“The presence of rhetorical discourse obviously indicates the presence of a
rhetorical situation.”).
24 Vatz, supra note 21, at 157. See also D. RYAN BERG, THE NEW WAY AND THE WAR R
ON TERROR: A GENERIC ANALYSIS OF GEORGE W. BUSH’S WAR RHETORIC 17–22 (2009).
25 MARY E. STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF 1 (1991).
26 Shifting Language: Trading Terrorism for Extremism, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, at 01:32
(July 27, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4772826 (statement of
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, director of Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Penn-
sylvania). See also CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 3 (“Presidential rhetoric is one R
source of institutional power, enhanced in the modern presidency by the ability of presidents to
speak when, where, and on whatever topic they choose, and to a national audience through
coverage by the electronic media.”).
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redefined by its occupants in their interactions with the people, it also
shapes and defines the national identity of the people.27  Presidents now
regularly “go over the heads” of Congress to the people at large, and it is
through presidential rhetoric that the “national fabric is woven.”28
Although today rhetorical leadership forms the essence of the mod-
ern presidency, historically this was not the case.  Until the twentieth
century, the “old way” of U.S. governance and politics proscribed rhetor-
ical presidency, and presidents did not engage in oral addresses to “the
people.”29  Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson initi-
ated the modern rhetorical presidency, in which popular rhetoric has be-
come a principal tool of presidential governance.30  This use of popular
rhetoric marked a significant departure from the “old way.”31  Yet, the
old rhetorical model itself recognized an important exception to the gen-
eral antipathy towards presidential public oratory.  Even prior to the
twentieth century, in matters pertaining to the conduct of war, presidents
have delivered popular speeches aimed directly at the general public.
While “attempts to move the nation by moral suasion in the absence of
war were almost unknown,”32 Jeffrey Tulis acknowledges that, “emer-
gency or crisis appeals to public opinion in the manner of Theodore
Roosevelt can be justified as consistent with the founding perspective.”33
A. Purposive Framing: The Functionality of the “War” Placeholder
The framing of issues and outcomes significantly shapes choices—
whether pertaining to private decisions or to public policy.  “Frames are
powerful nudges.”34  We all employ frames as interpretive emotional fil-
27 BERG, supra note 24, at 9. R
28 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 6. See also KERNELL, supra note 19. R
29 TULIS, supra note 1, at 4–5. R
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 173.  It is interesting to note that while presidential war rhetoric has been recog-
nized as exemplifying clear patterns that allow for discussing it as a distinct genre, this has not
been the case with other forms of presidential rhetoric in crises. See, e.g., Samantha D. Cart,
The Presidential Rhetoric in Times of Crisis: A Textual Analysis of Speeches by Franklin
Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan (2014) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, West Virginia Univer-
sity); Donna R. Hoffman & Alison D. Howard, The Presidential Rhetoric of Hard Times
(2010) (unpublished paper) (prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1643794.  Hoffman and
Howard’s work examines presidents’ rhetoric during economic downturns and concludes that
“there is not sufficient evidence to suggest there is a uniform presidential rhetoric of hard
times.” Id. at 4.
34 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 37 (2008) (suggesting that because “people tend to be
somewhat mindless, passive decision makers,” the way politicians, among others, frame issues
may easily persuade, or “nudge,” public opinion on those issues).  According to Thaler and
Sunstein, a “nudge” is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
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ters through which we make sense of events around us and messages we
receive.35  Framing filters serve as mental shortcuts in the process of de-
cision-making—i.e., as cognitive heuristics.  Reliance on framing as a
shortcut also means that whoever manages to control the framing of in-
formation will greatly influence, and can manipulate, the interpretation
and meaning that recipients of that information are likely to attach to it.36
As Jim Kuypers argues,
[f]raming is a process whereby communicators, con-
sciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of
view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be
interpreted by others in a particular manner.  Frames op-
erate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose
causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.37
In framing a given situation and affixing the label of “crisis,”
“emergency,” or “war” to it, the President is the nation’s chief “choice
architect.”38  When confronted with acute crises the President is often the
first to act and his actions are the most visible.  “In drama, magnitude
and finality,” wrote Justice Robert H. Jackson, “[the President’s] deci-
sions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public
eye and ear.”39  Presidential war rhetoric has facilitated the transforma-
tion of the original constitutional cooperative model—that of a president
going to Congress to request authorization for acting as commander in
chief—into a “justificatory genre designed to compel legislative ratifica-
tion.”40  In practice, presidential rhetoric works as “rhetoric of investi-
ture,”41 explaining and legitimating the need to concentrate powers in the
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic in-
centives.” Id. at 6.
35 ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERI-
ENCE 21 (1974) (arguing that frames offer a “schemata of interpretation”).
36 Barry Schwartz, When Words Decide, SCI. AM. MIND, Aug. 2007, at 37, 38.
37 JIM A. KUYPERS, BUSH’S WAR: MEDIA BIAS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WAR IN A TER-
RORIST AGE 8 (2009).
38 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 3 (defining “choice architect” as someone who R
“has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions”).
39 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
40 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 118 (“The rhetorical model in the Constitu- R
tion is that of a president going to Congress to request authorization for acting as commander
in chief; the model that has developed through time is that of a president assuming that role
and then asking for congressional ratification.  As a result, what began as a genre based on
reciprocity and cooperation has become a genre crafted to compel congressional approval as
well as public support of unilateral executive action . . . .  [A] cooperative genre has been
superseded by a justificatory genre designed to compel legislative ratification.”).
41 Id. at 113.
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Executive.42  Governmental powers expand in times of crisis.43  War
rhetoric leads to greater public acceptance, and even active demand by
the public, of government exercising expansive powers and authorities in
order to overcome the threat and restore peace and security.  The same
rhetoric also ensures the concentration of those expansive powers in the
hands of the Executive, strengthening it at the expense of the other two
branches.44  The Executive’s perceived ability to act swiftly, secretly,
and decisively against threats to the nation becomes superior to the ordi-
nary principles of limitation on governmental powers and individual
rights.45  The combination of “war” and being the first mover confers an
added layer of legitimacy to the actions of the Executive and, at times,
may even create new paradigms of legitimacy.46  It ensures popular sup-
port of the President’s actions47 as the public “rallies ‘round the flag”48
and follows the President’s lead.49  Similarly, the President is likely to
enjoy the acquiescence, if not outright affirmative support, by the legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government of his actions during a crisis.
The Executive Branch assumes a leading role in countering a crisis, with
the other two branches pushed aside (whether of their own volition or
42 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 183 (2013).
43 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 288–90 (1948).
44 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AF-
TER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117–49 (1990) (listing various reasons for congressional acqui-
escence of concentrated power in the Executive Branch at expense of the other two branches).
45 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 154 (Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1977) (1748); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98
YALE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1989).
46 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 69
(2010).
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting
that constitutions originated in the midst of great danger that led, among other things, to “an
enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diver-
sity of opinions on great national questions”). See also KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY
AND ITS ENEMIES 43, 198 (Princeton University Press, 5th ed. 1971); E.L. Quarantelli & Rus-
sell R. Dynes, Community Conflict: Its Absence and Its Presence in Natural Disasters, 1 MASS
EMERGENCIES 139, 140, 145 (1976).
48 BRUCE RUSSETT, CONTROLLING THE SWORD: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY 34 (1990); BERG, supra note 24, at 38–39; MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCT- R
ING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 31–38 (1988); see also GAD BARZILAI, A DEMOCRACY IN
WARTIME: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL 248–60 (1992).
49 Using such language reflects a greater threat to a state’s “vital” or even “supreme
interest[s].” CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR., ARTS OF POWER: STATECRAFT AND DIPLOMACY 9–10
(1997) (explaining that a state is more willing to “sacrifice many lesser interests and risk
suffering heavy damage in war to secure its vital interests if it calculates that it can so without
unduly jeopardizing its supreme interest in survival”).
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not).50  The President’s domination over the public agenda is facilitated
further by the realities of party politics.51
Thus, the President’s ability to frame the terms of the public dis-
course is greatly determinative not only of eventual outcomes and policy
decisions, but also of their perceived acceptability and legitimacy.  As
Wojtek Wolfe suggests, in the context of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, President Bush “utilized framing effects and threat rhetoric in order
to successfully accomplish risky foreign policy shifts . . . [in which the
administration] presented a situation to the public that implied a need for
decisions to be made under risk or uncertainty, allowing prospect theory
to be applied to the president’s framing of the issues.”52
Presidential war rhetoric and the narrative presidents have adopted
serve several distinct purposes.  Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen
Hall Jamieson’s study of presidential war rhetoric in the United States
identifies the main characteristics of such rhetoric.53  First, presidents
emphasize that the decision to use force is deliberate, serious, rational
(rather than emotional), and the result of thoughtful consideration.54  The
resort to force is portrayed as a measure of last resort made necessary by
the enemy’s intransigence and unwillingness to resolve the conflict by
peaceful means.55  Thus, war is forced on the United States, to which it
responds in self-defense.56  Yet, at the same time, the war rhetoric con-
tributes to the erosion of processes of deliberation and “decay of political
discourse,”57 replacing “discussion structured by the contestability of
opinion inherent to issues with a competition to please or manipulate the
public.”58
50 See KOH, supra note 44, at 117–49; ROSSITER, supra note 43, at 288–90. R
51 ROSSITER, supra note 43, at 240–55; KOH, supra note 44, at 117–23; Mark Tushnet, R
Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2677 (2005).
52 WOJTEK MACKIEWICZ WOLFE, WINNING THE WAR OF WORDS: SELLING THE WAR ON
TERROR FROM AFGHANISTAN TO IRAQ 1 (2008).
53 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 104–05; see also BERG supra note 24, at R
52–64 (finding these characteristics in President George W. Bush’s war rhetoric justifying the
war in Iraq, but noting their absence from the rhetoric used to justify the war in Afghanistan,
Berg explains that such rhetorical tactics had been unnecessary in the case of the war in Af-
ghanistan due to the unique rhetorical situation created by the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001); HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN WORLD WAR I (1971).
54 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 105. R
55 See id.
56 On the significance of the portrayal of war as defensive in character see, Robert L.
Ivie, Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War, 47 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 279,
290 (1980).
57 TULIS, supra note 1, at 176. R
58 TULIS, supra note 1, at 178–79. See also id. at 179 (“[T]he terms of discourse that R
structure subsequent ‘sober’ discussion of policy are altered, reshaping the political world in
which that policy and future policy is understood and implemented.  By changing the meaning
of policy, rhetoric alters policy itself and the meaning of politics in the future.”); CHRISTOPHER
KELLEY & MARIA TERESA MARTINEZ, AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASSOC., HITTING CAMELS IN THE
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Significantly, Campbell and Jamieson also find that presidents have
used dramatic narrative filled with emotionally charged language to iden-
tify major threats by clearly identifiable enemies to the nation and the
American way of life that must be immediately and forcefully met.59
Presidential war rhetoric often exhorts the audience—the American peo-
ple—to unanimity of purpose and total commitment.  It distinguishes be-
tween “us” and “them” and harnesses that distinction to constitute the
audience as a “united community of patriots that is urged to repulse the
threat with all available resources.”60  Although the “Us-Them” distinc-
tion is not unique to wartime,61 acute crises lead to heightened individual
and group consciousness.62  Allegiance to the community and the will-
ingness to sacrifice for its sake—in certain situations, the willingness to
make the ultimate sacrifice of one’s own life—receive a higher premium
and attention in times of peril that endanger the group.
War rhetoric not only constitutes the “united community of patri-
ots;” it also identifies and names the enemy.63  Presidential rhetoric iden-
tifies and addresses two socially constructed target populations, i.e., “us”
who need protecting and the “dangerous others” who threaten us.64
Clear lines of demarcation are drawn around “them,” separating them
from “us.”65  Thus, President George W. Bush announced shortly after
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that, “[e]very nation, in every region, now
has a decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists.”66  In identifying the enemy, several rhetorical tools are com-
monly utilized.  Stereotyping is often employed with respect both to in-
siders and to outsiders, emphasizing gallant, noble, and worthy attributes
BUTT: WAR RHETORIC AND DELIBERATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERROR-
IST ATTACKS (2002).
59 See CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 105–18. R
60 Id. at 111.
61 See DAVID BERREBY, US AND THEM: THE SCIENCE OF IDENTITY (2d ed. 2008).
62 OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA N´I AOL ´AIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POW-
ERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 220–27 (2006).
63 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 111. R
64 See, e.g., Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social Construction of Target Popula-
tions: Implications for Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334 (1993); JAMES A.
MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2003).
65 See Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1504 (1986); W. A. ELLIOTT, US AND THEM: A STUDY OF GROUP
CONSCIOUSNESS 6–10 (1986).
66 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (September 20, 2011), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives
.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; see also, Michael Kelly, Pacifist Claptrap,
WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2001, at A25 (“A war has been declared; you are either on one side or
another.  You are either doing what is necessary to capture or kill those who control and fund
and harbor the terrorists, or you are for not doing this.  If you are for not doing this, you are for
allowing the terrorists to continue their attacks on America.  You are saying, in fact: I believe
that it is better to allow more Americans— perhaps a great many more—to be murdered than
to capture or kill the murders.”).
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of the former, and negative traits of the barbarian and demonic “other.”67
The language used is that of “good vs. evil,”68 which may be accompa-
nied, at times, by strong religious overtones.69  Internal conformities
within the community are exaggerated, while divergence from “outsid-
ers” is emphasized.70  War rhetoric facilitates this drawing of the con-
tours of conflict around groups and communities.  Thus, “a discourse of
indignation, threat and suffering . . . communicated within a group, can
become the basis for mobilization against an identified enemy.”71  As
Robert Ivie suggests, “a people strongly committed to the ideal of peace,
but simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe that the
fault for any such disruption of their ideal lies with others.”72
A special feature of group construction in this context is the element
of foreignness.  In his seminal study, Strangers in the Land, John
67 See ELLIOTT, supra note 65, at 9; J. GLENN GRAY, THE WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS ON R
MEN IN BATTLE 156–202 (1973); Ronald F. Reid, New England Rhetoric and the French War,
1754-1760: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of War, 43 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 259, 267–69
(1976); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586–87 (2002);
see also KELLEY & MARTINEZ, supra note 58, at 10 (“In a truly Manichean dual fashion the us R
is ultimately equated with all that is good.  Writers of both newspapers use words like strong,
globalizers, rightful leaders, disciplined, rich, powerful, great and free nation, brave and pa-
tient, courageous, cooperative and compassionate to describe us. Them is conceptualized as
non-US (not us); [a]s not belonging to the same world and following a different, thus wrong
logic.  It is also thought of as non-Western and underdeveloped and at last they (them) be-
comes code for evil.  This is portrayed in the use of words like: outsider, resentful, backward,
frustrated, weak, traditionalists, crazy killers, murderous, ruthless, anti-Christian, impover-
ished, medieval, irrational, vengeful and elusive enemy, mad with murder.”).
68 See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Photo
Opportunity with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://georgew
bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html (declaring that “This
will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil.  But good will prevail.”); George W. Bush,
President of the U.S., Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16
.html (positioning America and its allies as “those who want peace and security in the world”
against evil acts of terrorism).
69 See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President upon
Arrival (Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/relea
ses/2001/09/20010916-2.html (asking for “God’s good graces” and prayers on “the Lord’s
Day” (Sunday)).
70 GRAY, supra note 67, at 156–202; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational R
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 55–57
(2004).
71 Michael Billig, Preface to MIRJANA N. DEDAI ´C & DANIEL N. NELSON, AT WAR WITH
WORDS, at xiii (2003). See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., America vs. the Narrative,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, at WK8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/opin
ion/29friedman.html.
72 Robert L. Ivie, Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War, 47 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 279, 280 (1980); accord ROBERT L. IVIE, DEMOCRACY AND AMERICA’S WAR ON
TERROR 10–49 (2005). See also DENISE M. BOSTDORFF, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE RHETORIC
OF FOREIGN CRISIS 205–40 (1994) (detailing “the characteristic situation, style, and identifica-
tional appeals of presidential crisis rhetoric” from Presidents John F. Kennedy to George H.W.
Bush).
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Higham analyzes the phenomenon of American Nativism, which he de-
fines as “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its
foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections.”73  Higham finds patterns of
nativistic attitudes throughout American history, focusing, in particular,
on anti-Catholicism, anti-radicalism, and racial nativism.74  Yet, he also
notes that “nativism usually rises and falls in some relation to other in-
tense kinds of national feeling.”75  Intense moments have led to the in-
tensification and polarization of pre-existing nativistic sentiments.  The
stigma of foreignness, of un-Americanism, is not limited to the distinc-
tion of citizenship.  “Foreign” connotes, in a real sense, anything that
threatens the “American way of life.”  The links to things and influences
from abroad can then be easily made.  Race, religion, and eventually
ideas and beliefs and associations can, and have been, described as “for-
eign,” mobilizing significant popular forces against particular groups.
As William Wiecek notes: “Since the early nineteenth century, Ameri-
cans have nurtured a consistent fear that alien ideologies, as well as the
foreigners who were thought to be their vectors, were invading the pris-
tine American republic.”76  In the aftermath of September 11, the identi-
fication of the terrorists as foreigners has followed this pattern.  It also
serves to explain the particular shock and feelings of betrayal and revul-
sion that accompany attacks orchestrated by “home grown terrorists.”77
The combination of heightened levels of fear and anxiety and the
identification and naming of the enemy who is held responsible for
threatening the people may eventually result in a moral panic.78  The
behavior of the clearly identifiable group of “enemies”—real or con-
structed as such79—who are depicted as “folk devils,” is seen as harmful
or threatening to the values and even existence of the nation and the
73 JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
1860–1925, at 4 (1955).
74 Id. at 5–11.
75 Id. at 4.
76 William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Back-
ground of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 381.
77 See, e.g., Editorial, The Chilling Challenge of Home-Grown Jihadis: We Need to Con-
front the Message, Not Just the Bombers, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at 18, available at http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bfba6b2e-f403-11d9-af32-00000e2511c8.html; Jonathan Guthrie &
Chris Tighe, Op-Ed., The Eerily Ordinary Extremists, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at 13, availa-
ble at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a19b0638-f559-11d9-8ffc-00000e2511c8.html; Russell
Jenkins et al., The London Bombers, THE TIMES, July 15, 2005, at 4, available at http://www
.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1935460.ece.
78 ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF DEVIANCE 37–38 (2d ed. 2009).
79 PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY: PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM ACTS IN BRITAIN 257 (1993) (noting that the most important feature of the series
of Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain has been the way in which they have constructed a
suspect community in Britain: the Irish community living in Britain or traveling between Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland).
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people.80  Moral panics with their identification of “us” not merely as the
good folk but also as the “victims”81 of the behavior of deviant “others”
lead to a “tough on crime” mentality among the public, the press, law
enforcement agents, politicians, and the courts.82  Thus, facilitated by
governmental rhetoric, and further inflamed by media exaggeration,83
moral panics, such as those that may come about as a result of high-
profile terrorist attacks, in turn create immense pressures on all three
branches of government to “do something” about the threat.  As politi-
cians and legislators engage increasingly in “symbolic alignments”—in
which what counts is not the nature of the target but rather being seen as
taking a position “against the devil and on the side of angels”—the focus
is clearly put on a particular threat, terrorism, caused by a clearly identi-
fiable group of folk devils, rather than on other types of threat, such as
the infringement on civil liberties.84
The dichotomized and polarizing dialectic of “us versus them” not
only facilitates mobilization of the people, but also reverts to the essen-
tial characteristic of presidential war rhetoric as rhetoric of investiture, as
it accounts for the greater willingness to confer sweeping war and emer-
gency powers on the government.85  This is especially so when the
“other” is well defined and clearly separable from the members of the
community.86
B. Presidential War Rhetoric
“[T]he appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a
fact or of a rare situation.”87  Defining the situation as a “crisis,” an
80 STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS
AND ROCKERS 11–12 (1972); see also DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY
WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE OTHERS (2011) (discussing the phenomenon of the
“dehumanization” of other groups of human beings).
81 Frank Furedi, Fear and Security: A Vulnerability-Led Policy Response, 42 SOC. POL’Y
& ADMIN. 645, 651 (2008) (“A vulnerability-led analysis of contemporary times tends to re-
gard society one-sidedly as a target and people as victims . . . .  Its defining feature is a
powerful sense of vulnerability to risk and an inflated assessment of the threat it faces.” (em-
phasis omitted)).
82 For the latter see, e.g., Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns
for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101, 1117–20 (2006) (describing how elected judges take on a “tough on crime” stance in
response to uninformed “media-induced public outrage”). See also Melissa Hamilton, The
Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679 (2012)
(describing how the moral panic surrounding child pornography produces a “net-widening”
effect that unnecessarily punishes even “low-risk individuals and relatively harmless
behaviors”).
83 GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 78, at 88–108. R
84 Id. at 26.
85 CAMPBELL & JAMIESON, supra note 16, at 113. R
86 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 220–22. R
87 EDELMAN, supra note 48, at 31. R
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“emergency,” or “war” (rather than merely a “problem”) changes the
public perception and “heralds instability” which gathers public support
for whatever actions need to be taken.88  Hence, “[i]f yearning for secur-
ity and protection creates leaders, leaders themselves do more than their
share to construct the threats to well-being that keep those aspirations
alive.”89  People’s need to pass their guilt and responsibility to someone
in charge is facilitated through rhetoric of leadership.  The President “is
likely to latch onto more-or-less serious challenges to the political com-
munity and refashion them into life-or-death threats, or if the crisis at
hand is indeed a dire one, milk it for everything it is worth politically
even at the cost of undermining the rule of law.”90
The term “war” makes people hypersensitive to particular narratives
and heightens their feelings of fear, hysteria, panic, insecurity, outrage,
and xenophobia.  These particularly strong emotions have a pronounced
effect on people’s perceptions of, and reactions to, risk because they act
as multipliers of the perceived likelihood of risk.91  That effect is then
amplified and re-amplified as a result of emotional contagion.  Individu-
als are highly responsive to other people’s emotions, and certain emo-
tions, such as fear, are particularly contagious.92
People also shape their opinions (particularly their publicly ex-
pressed opinions) to conform with the dominant position in the relevant
reference group because they like to “belong” and to be favorably per-
ceived by others.93  This is especially so the less people feel that they
know about a certain issue; they then tend to rely on the judgments of
those “in the know.”  War means uncertainty.  The notion of the fog of
war is not limited to the frontlines but is applicable to the home front as
well.  Decision-making that takes place under conditions of uncertainty
is particularly prone to the influences of informational and reputational
influences and cascades.  “In an informational cascade,” writes Cass
Sunstein, “people cease relying . . . on their private information or opin-
ions.  They decide instead on the basis of the signals conveyed by
88 Id.
89 Id. at 38.
90 William E. Scheuerman, Presidentialism and Emergency Powers, in EMERGENCIES
AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 258, 266 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008).
91 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 544–45; see generally Peter M. Sandman, Hazard Versus
Outrage in the Public Perception of Risk, in EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: THE ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 45 (Vincent T.
Covello et al. eds., 1989) (describing the “outrage model”).
92 ELAINE HATFIELD ET AL., EMOTIONAL CONTAGION 115 (1994).
93 For discussion of “reputational cascade” see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 74–95 (2003) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT] . See also Cass
R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 15–17 (Law Sch. Univ. Chi.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 215, April 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121400.
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others. . . .  It follows that the behavior of the first few people can, in
theory, produce similar behavior from countless followers.”94  Violent
crises, emergencies, counter-terrorism measures, and war present signifi-
cant information asymmetries among the various branches of govern-
ment and between the government and the public, and are thus especially
prone to the effects of informational cascades.95  Informational cascades
also partially explain why “civilians”—including not merely the public at
large, but also the Judicial, and Legislative Branches of government, as
well as individuals within the Executive Branch—tend to defer to the
judgment of military experts in such matters.96
Availability entrepreneurs, including the President himself, may
seek to manipulate such informational and reputational cascades.  They
have a particular stake in the outcomes of the policy-making process and
may seek to shape and influence public discourse to control the policy-
selection process.97  This may not only lead other organizations and insti-
tutions, including the courts, to accord a significant margin of apprecia-
tion and deference to the judgments of national security entrepreneurs,
but also molds the general public’s perception of the risks that terrorists,
wars, or emergencies present to the nation.98  High-magnitude, low-
probability threats are especially susceptible to governmental
“probability inflation”99 as they involve acute informational asymmetries
between the Executive and other government branches and the public.100
“War,” much like “national security,” is invoked as a “god term,”
i.e., a rhetorical absolute that imparts the capacity to demand sacrifice,
“for when a term is so sacrosanct that the material goods of this life must
be mysteriously rendered up for it, then we feel justified in saying that it
is in some sense ultimate.”101  As such, a “god term” is an enabler on
multiple levels.  At the same time, the term “war” says very little about
94 SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT, supra note 93, at 55. R
95 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1052 n.169 (2003).
96 Id. at 1034.
97 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 727 (1999). See also Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Public-
ity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2154–55 (2009) (distinguishing the availability heuristic from availa-
bility cascades and campaigns).
98 See Oren Gross, Security vs. Liberty: On Emotions and Cognition, in THE LONG DEC-
ADE: HOW 9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 45, 55 (David Jenkins et al. eds., 2014).
99 Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1325 (2007).
100 See id. at 1329.  Masur notes, “High-magnitude harms are national-security-implicat-
ing harms, and national-security-implicating harms are the province of the executive.” Id. at
1330.
101 LANGUAGE IS SERMONIC: RICHARD M. WEAVER ON THE NATURE OF RHETORIC 88, 90
(Richard M. Johannesen et al. eds., 1970).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP201.txt unknown Seq: 16  4-FEB-15 13:13
256 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24:241
its specific content because only the actual content can speak for itself.102
The notion of “war” is highly generalized and is used to define every-
thing that falls into its purview.
The seductive attributes of the war frame have not been lost on pres-
idents even outside the context of armed conflict.  In his 1933 inaugural
address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared: “I assume un-
hesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a
disciplined attack upon our common problems.”103  Those “common
problems,” against which Roosevelt assumed command of the “army of
people,” were economic, not militaristic.  Roosevelt went on to warn
Congress that should it fail to enact and authorize him to take the neces-
sary measures to face the economic crisis, he would “not evade the clear
course of duty that will then confront [him].”104  He stated, “I shall ask
the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad
Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the
power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign
foe.”105
Similarly, in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson invoked war imagery,
with its attendant built-in assumptions about the powers of the federal
government, particularly the Executive Branch, when he declared war on
poverty.106  President Johnson’s strategy was to develop the popular rhet-
oric that would “serve[ ] as a surrogate for deliberation at crucial junc-
tures of the congressional process.  The content of the poverty program
was shaped, in large measure, by the ‘imperatives’ or the ‘logic’ of the
War on Poverty rhetoric.”107  In his first State of the Union message,
102 See RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC 212 (1953) (the phrase “God
term” was coined and identified with a set of particular words to a certain age that have
“inherent potency” in their meanings).
103 Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933),
available at http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-franklin-d-
roosevelt-1933.
104 Id.
105 Id. See also DAVIS W. HOUCK, RHETORIC AS CURRENCY: HOOVER, ROOSEVELT, AND
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 195–200 (2001) (examining President Hoover and President
Roosevelt’s economic rhetoric and its relation to policy concerns); William E. Leuchtenburg,
The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 81, 81–82 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1964) (discussing President Hoover’s use
of war imagery to describe the Great Depression); Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the
Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 70–76 (1983) (analogizing the Great De-
pression to World War I and characterizing it as a war against economic ruin).
106 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL L. GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN
ORAL HISTORY, at xi–xii (2010); DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S WAR ON POVERTY:
RHETORIC AND HISTORY, at xiii (1986).
107 TULIS, supra note 1, at 161.  Tulis contrasts Johnson’s approach with Woodrow Wil- R
son’s failed rhetorical practice regarding the League of Nations, where the merits of a techni-
cally complex program had been worked out first, leaving the President with the difficult task
of explaining it to the public later. Id.
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President Johnson declared an “unconditional war on poverty in
America” and urged, “Congress and all Americans to join with [him] in
that effort.”108  However, at the time of this declaration, most of the con-
crete details and measures necessary to wage the war had yet to be fig-
ured out.109  Thus, the President’s message was not about setting out
specific programs to fight poverty, but rather,
[T]he simple declaration of war.  The metaphor of war
not only structured or provided the form for that section
of the speech, it constituted its meaning as well . . . .  In
place of an argument indicating why poverty should be
considered a national problem, why it required a coordi-
nated program, why present efforts were insufficient or
ill-conceived, and why the kinds of legislation suggested
by the [P]resident fit together as a single program—in-
stead of this, the [P]resident offered a metaphor, whose
premise provided the answers.  If we were at war with
poverty, such an effort would require a national mobili-
zation, coordination, extensive executive discretion, and
the potential involvement of virtually any social program
as vital to the war effort.110
Within six weeks of the President’s speech “an extensive six-title legisla-
tive package” was put together.111  “[T]he primary problem was to fash-
ion a program that fit Johnson’s rhetoric . . . one program . . . could not
show enough significant ‘victories’ to constitute a nation seriously at
war, but it was thought that an effort with five or six visible programs
might indeed appear to be a warlike effort.”112  The bill was accompa-
nied by the President’s Special Message to the Congress Proposing a
Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty.113  Once again, the Message
108 Lyndon Johnson, President of the U.S., Annual Message to Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), available at http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/selected-speeches/
november-1963-1964/01-08-1964.html.
109 TULIS, supra note 1, at 162 (quoting JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE
EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 135 (1968)).
110 TULIS, supra note 1, at 164–65. R
111 Id. at 166.  Note the similar gap in time between 9/11 and the enactment of USA
PATRIOT Act (enacted on October 26, 2001). See Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2001)).
112 TULIS, supra note 1, at 166. See also SUNDQUIST supra note 109, at 142 (“The Presi- R
dent and the [p]ress had by this time built up expectations so vast that a one-idea, one-title bill
would be a serious letdown.  The very idea of a massive coordinated attack on poverty sug-
gested mobilizing under that banner all, or as many as possible, of the weapons that would be
used.”).
113 Lyndon Johnson, President of the U.S., President’s Special Message to the Congress
Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty (Mar. 18, 1964), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26109.
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did not attempt to provide a detailed defense of the programs included in
the bill, but rather was drafted in the style and format of a popular ad-
dress.114  It included such phrases as: “To finish [the] work I have called
for a national war on poverty.  Our objective: total victory” and “[o]n
similar occasions in the past we have been called upon to wage war
against foreign enemies which threatened our freedom.  Today we are
asked to declare war on a domestic enemy which threatens the strength
of our nation and the welfare of our people.”115
President Nixon’s War on Drugs followed the well-established path
of presidential war rhetoric when he announced in 1973 that, “[d]rug
abuse is still public enemy number one in America. . . .  We have already
made encouraging progress in the war against drug abuse.  Now we must
consolidate that progress and strike even harder.”116  All subsequent
presidents made use of similar war rhetoric,117 with the exception of
President Carter, who framed the issue in terms of law enforcement and
criminal law,118 and President Obama who introduced a public health
framing.119
President George W. Bush and his administration’s decision to in-
voke the imagery, frames, metaphors, and associative connections of
“war” was a conscious decision after the terrorist attacks of September
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Radio Address About the State of the Union
Message on Law Enforcement and Drug Abuse Prevention (Mar. 10, 1973), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4135.
117 WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 20, at 87–88 (quoting President Ford’s reference to R
“the international war on drugs”); id. at 86 (quoting President Reagan: “Drugs are menacing
our society.  They’re threatening our values and undermining our institutions.  They’re killing
our children . . . .  Drug abuse is a repudiation of everything America is . . . mock[s] our
heritage . . . we mobilize for this national crusade.”); id. at 90–91 (quoting President George
H.W. Bush: “[L]ike all wars, we must be united in our efforts as a country and as a commu-
nity . . . join as one . . . all must be part of this crusade for a drug-free America. . . .  We will
not surrender our children. . . .  We [are] in this fight to win . . . .”); id. at 91(quoting President
Clinton: “We must fight drugs on every front, on our streets and in our schools, at our borders
and in our homes.  Every American must accept this responsibility.  There is no more insidious
threat to a good future than illegal drugs.  I’m counting on all of you to help us win the fight
against them.”); id. at 92 (quoting President George W. Bush: “You can’t ask people on the
frontline of the war on terror to protect the American people and then not give them the tools
necessary to do so. . . .  The information-sharing provisions in the PATRIOT Act helped [to]
connect the dots in an Al Qaida drugs-for-weapons plot.”).
118 Id. at 89 (quoting President Carter: “I’m ordering the Attorney General to concentrate
on breaking the links between organized crime and drug traffic, to enhance cooperation among
all law enforcement agencies, and to ensure more certain conviction and quick punishment for
those who traffic in drugs”).
119 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President at University of Ma-
ryland Town Hall (July 22, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/07/22/remarks-president-university-maryland-town-hall (“We need to have an approach
that emphasizes prevention, treatment, a public health model for reducing drug use in our
country.”).
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11, 2001.  In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, administration
spokespersons framed the attacks, and the need to respond to them, in
terms of law enforcement, calling the attacks a “crime” and emphasizing
the United States’ resolve to bring those responsible to justice.120  That
approach changed quickly.  Recognizing the moment as “an opportu-
nity,” the President set the course away from the law enforcement frame
and towards a decidedly war rhetoric.121  Brushing aside objections to
the use of war terminology from within his administration—for example,
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers
who argued that “if you call it a war, then you think of people in uniform
as being the solution,”122 and from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
who preferred to speak of “global struggle against violent extrem-
ism”123—the President made his position clear: “Make no mistake about
it, we are at war.”124  Also, by identifying the war as a war “on terror-
ism”—a technique or a method, rather than a clearly identified enemy—
there was greater ambiguity and malleability in the operating space of the
administration.  Using the rhetoric of war, the President was able to
frame the threats facing the nation and the responses to these threats
away from a criminal law model and instead anchor them in a decidedly
war model.125
Using the language and rhetoric of “war” to frame the events of 9/
11 allowed President Bush to cast himself in the role of a war president,
playing directly to “[t]he tendency of presidents to see themselves as the
most immediate embodiments of a unitary popular will, standing above
normal politics and in possession of super-mundane talents and a special
aura.”126  The war frame confers legitimacy on a wide spectrum of presi-
dential actions, including many that would have otherwise been strongly
challenged.  As Richard Jackson comments: “[T]he discourse of the war
on terrorism . . . set the logic and possibilities of policy formulation in
120 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at White House Press Briefing (Sept. 11,
2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010911-10.html.
121 BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 32 (2002). See also LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 148 R
(by invoking the war frame, the President could “outframe” the framers of the Constitution).
122 Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, New Name for ‘War on Terror’ Reflects Wider U.S.
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A7.
123 Id.
124 Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is “War on Terror,” N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/politics/04bush.html; see also KEL-
LEY & MARTINEZ, supra note 58, at 4–5. R
125 See, e.g., Elaine Tyler May, Echoes of the Cold War: The Aftermath of September 11
at Home, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 35, 39 (Mary L. Dudziak
ed. 2003).
126 Scheuerman, supra note 90, at 266. R
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the first instance . . . [and] helped to create the wider legitimacy and
social consensus that [is] required to enact . . . policy.”127
The use of the language of war also justified appeals for national
and individual sacrifice while, at the same time, undermining the possi-
bility of robust opposition because opponents could be, and were, easily
castigated as being unpatriotic, defeatists, fifth column[ists], soft on ter-
ror, and even putting soldiers in harm’s way.  Similarly, Tulis notes that
in the context of the War on Poverty, the war rhetoric “puts doubters
under the suspicion of being in favor of poverty” and of being “unpatri-
otic, immoral, or both.”128  As George Orwell suggests in his Principles
of Newspeak, “The purpose of Newspeak [is] not only to provide a me-
dium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the
devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossi-
ble. . . .  [A] heretical thought . . . should be literally unthinkable, at least
so far as thought is dependent on words.”129
Framing is closely linked to the phenomenon of anchoring.  Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman demonstrated that when needing to make
numerical estimates and judgments, the first number with which a deci-
sion-maker is presented has a demonstrably disproportionate effect on
that person’s ultimate choice.130  That first number becomes the anchor
to which all future assessments are then tied even when the anchor is
clearly irrelevant.131  Anchors strongly influence the ultimate decision, in
so far as they would be taken as the starting points against which adjust-
ments are made and as influences on subsequent decisions and actions.132
This concept can be readily applied to the War on Terror.  Anchoring the
traumatic events of September 11 in the context of “war” has greatly
shaped and influenced the responses to the attacks.  The baseline for fu-
ture reference—the first “number” with which we were presented—was
“war.”  Everything followed from that.  Using the rhetoric of war, the
President was able to frame the threats facing the nation and the re-
sponses to these threats away from a criminal law model and instead
127 Richard Jackson, Language, Policy and the Construction of a Torture Culture in the
War on Terrorism, 33 REV. INT’L STUD. 353, 354 (2007); Richard Jackson, Aberystwyth
Univ., Political Language, Policy Formulation and the Practice of Torture in the War on Ter-
rorism: Implications for Human Rights 2 (Sept. 3, 2006), available at http://www.aber.ac.uk/
en/media/departmental/interpol/csrv/political-language-and-torture-richard-3.pdf; see also
RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: LANGUAGE, POLITICS AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM (2005).
128 TULIS, supra note 1, at 171. R
129 GEORGE ORWELL, Appendix: The Principles of Newspeak, in 1984, at 246 (The New
American Library ed., Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc. 1964).
130 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457–58 (1974).
131 Id.
132 Id.  See also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND JUDGMENT OF DECISION MAKING
145–46 (1993).
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anchor them in a decidedly war model.133  The media and public quickly
picked up the message that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were not a
crime, but an act of war against the United States.  For example, George
Will wrote in the Washington Post on September 23, 2001 that, “[t]he
goal is not to ‘bring terrorists to justice,’ which suggests bringing them
into sedate judicial settings—lawyers, courtrooms, due process, all pre-
ceded by punctilious readings of Miranda rights.  Rather, the goal is de-
struction of enemies.”134  Once put in place, the war frame was repeated
over and over again until it was eventually used reflexively rather than
reflectively, becoming normalized rather than conceived of as aberra-
tional and exceptional.
The war frame informs us of a sharp break with peacetime nor-
malcy.  The message is that war is a discontinuity, a cusp, beyond which
rules that pertain to the ordinary way of things no longer apply.135  Presi-
dent George W. Bush sought to convey precisely this message, making
his war narrative even more compelling, by invoking the four most ex-
pensive words in the English language: “This time is different”136—the
“New Paradigm” frame.137  The war frame buttressed the argument by
suggesting that existing laws and institutions were incompatible with the
new and unprecedented challenges that the nation was facing.  Indeed,
violent crises tend to bring about a rush to legislate.
The prevailing belief may be that if new offenses are
added to the criminal code and the scope of existing of-
fenses broadened, and if the arsenal of law enforcement
agencies is enhanced by putting at their disposal more
sweeping powers to search and seize, to eavesdrop, to
interrogate, to detain without trial, and to deport, the
133 May, supra note 125, at 39–41. R
134 George F. Will, Battle Hymn, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at B07.
135 But see, Michael Walzer, First, Define the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at
A35 (“The word [‘war’] is unobjectionable so long as those who use it understand what a
metaphor is.  There is, right now, no enemy state, no obvious battlefield.  “War” may serve
well, however, as a metaphor to signify struggle, commitment, endurance.  Military action,
though it may come, is not the first thing we should be thinking about.  Instead, in this “war”
on terrorism three other things take precedence: intensive police work across national borders,
an ideological campaign to engage all the arguments and excuses for terrorism and reject them,
and a serious and sustained diplomatic effort.”).
136 Sir John Templeton quotation. See KENNETH L. FISHER, MARKETS NEVER FORGET
(BUT PEOPLE DO): HOW YOUR MONEY IS COSTING YOU MONEY—AND WHY THIS TIME ISN’T
DIFFERENT 1 (2011).
137 See Editorial, In for the Long Haul, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A10 (“Coming to
terms with that new reality, winning this war, will require discipline, stamina and sacrifice.”).
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country will be more secure and better able to face the
emergency.138
It is often easier to pass new legislation than to examine why the
existing legislation, and the powers granted under it to the government
and its agencies, was not sufficient.  This procedure allows the govern-
ment to demonstrate that it is doing something against the dangers facing
the nation rather than sitting idly.  The need to respond quickly to future
threats—as much as to assure the public that its government is acting
with a vengeance against past and future terrorists—frequently results in
rushed legislation, often without much debate and at times forgoing nor-
mal legislative procedures.139  Once again, the “war” rhetoric displaces
deliberation and stifles dissent.
C. Presidential “Non-War” Rhetoric
Despite the perceived advantages to the president gained by invok-
ing the imagery of war, we can readily find examples of presidents shy-
ing away from war rhetoric and instead labeling a crisis as something
less than a war.  After all, too frequent utilization of the war rhetoric will
result in its dilution and undermine its usefulness and potency when it is
actually needed.  There are also lessons learned from previous declara-
tions of “wars.”  President Johnson’s popular rhetoric in the context of
the War on Poverty offered the President popular support as well as full
control of the legislative agenda.  However, it also “ensured that he and
not Congress would be blamed if the program failed.  And fail it did.”140
Similarly, President Bush’s persistent use of the Global War on Terror
frame resulted in a decline in the President’s approval ratings and in sup-
port for the Iraq War.141
The president may choose not to invoke the terminology of war and
warfare in order to de-escalate tensions with other countries or to avoid
the application of the jus ad bellum international legal regime from ap-
plying.142  The terminology of war and armed conflict has direct legal
ramifications as far as international legal rules and norms are concerned.
138 Gross, supra note 95, at 1031–32. See also Kent Roach, The Dangers of a Charter- R
Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON
CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 131, 138–42 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2001).
139 Gross, supra note 95, at 1031–32; Roach, supra note 138, at 138–42. R
140 TULIS, supra note 1, at 172. R
141 BERG, supra note 24, at 51, 65–73.  In this context, Berg notes specifically the change R
in the rhetorical situation brought about by the President himself when he made his “mission
accomplished” speech on May 1, 2003. Id. at 65 (“Bush’s rhetoric changed the rhetorical
situation.  No longer were we in a war . . . Bush set about a new rhetorical situation: we were
now in control of the country.”).
142 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Rhetorical Capture, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 466 (2012)
(discussing what she terms “rhetorical capture by substitution” that occurs when weak words
are substituted for strong ones, “[ ]war is police action, attack is preemption[ ].  This strategy
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It signifies the transition from one set of international legal rules to a
distinctly different legal regime, i.e., the law of armed conflict (or inter-
national humanitarian law).  And while the Bush Administration found
the war paradigm to be preferable to the criminal law and law enforce-
ment paradigm when fighting against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, it
wished to redefine that paradigm so as not to accord the protections of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and specifically the Third Geneva
Convention that deals with prisoners of war) to Al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees captured and held by the United States.143
Refraining from invoking the terminology of war may also have
direct domestic legal ramifications.  Under the Constitution, Congress,
rather than the President, is vested with the power to declare war.144  Al-
though the President is authorized (indeed bound) “to resist force by
force . . . without waiting for any special legislative authority”145 when
the country is invaded by a foreign nation, he does not have the authority
under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situ-
ation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the
nation.  However, presidents have made the argument that if committing
American armed forces does not constitute “war” then there is no consti-
tutional requirement for a congressional declaration of war prior to the
president’s taking military action abroad.  Thus, for example, a memo-
randum prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) setting out the
President’s authority to use military force in Libya in 2011, argued that
not every military engagement, however limited, that the President initi-
ates falls within the Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution.146
Rather, the “nature, scope and duration” of the engagement ought to be
evaluated.147  In the context of the intervention in Libya, the OLC con-
cluded that the use of military force would not amount to “war” in the
can dissipate political arousal in the populace by dislodging a political or moral
commitment.”).
143 For France’s refusal to accord POW status to captured FLN members during the Alge-
rian War, see, e.g., Gross & Nı´ Aola´in, supra note 62, at 190–202; Katherine Draper, Why a R
War Without a Name May Need One: Policy-Based Application of International Humanitarian
Law in the Algerian War, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 575 (2013).  For the Arab-Israeli context, see,
e.g., Christopher C. Burris, Comment, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO
Fedayeen, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 943 (1997); Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the
War Against Terrorism—The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1188–94 (2002).
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
145 The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (Grier,
J.).
146 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 8 (Apr. 1, 2011), 2011 WL
1459998, [hereinafter Libya Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Advisor U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement Regarding the Use of Force in Libya (Mar. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm.
147 Libya Memo, supra note 146, at 10. R
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constitutional sense and thus would not require prior congressional ap-
proval.148  In particular, the opinion emphasized the limited nature of the
mission and the fact that the use of force would be confined to air strikes
and that no ground troops were going to be deployed.149  The anticipated
military operation would be “time-limited, well-defined, discrete and
aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe” and the air
strikes “limited in their nature, duration, and scope.”150  Pointing to “his-
torical gloss” placed on the Constitution by two hundred years of prac-
tice,151 the OLC opined that “war” in the constitutional sense mostly
referred to “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically in-
volving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a
substantial period.”152  Again, what is important to note here is not the
soundness of the particular interpretation given by the OLC—challenges
can surely be mounted153—but rather the end which that interpretation
serves.
II. STATE POSITIONING, RHETORIC, AND “WAR”
“It was this moral authority, whereby the United States
was intrinsically linked with the idea of the Good, to
which Robert Jackson referred in the first words of his
opening speech to the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg: ‘That four great nations, flushed with vic-
tory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judg-
ment of the law is one of the most significant tributes
that Power has ever paid to Reason.’  At the same time,
by positioning itself as the champion of the law, the
148 Id. at 12–13.
149 Id. at 13.
150 Koh, supra note 146. R
151 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–32 (2012); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1097, 1099–100 (2013).
152 Libya Memo, supra note 146, at 8. R
153 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 (2d
ed. 1996) (“[T]he use of force for foreign policy purposes can almost imperceptibly become a
national commitment to war.”).  There is always the risk that even if the use of force is limited
initially in scope, nature and purpose, things may get out of control.  At the same time, ac-
cepting the OLC interpretation may potentially read Congress out of the processes leading up
to war since, in some sense, every use of force is “limited.” See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya,
“Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Inter-
pretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2011); Louis Fisher, Military Operations in Libya: No
War? No Hostilities?, 42 PRES. STUD. Q. 176, 180–83 (2012); Bruce Ackerman & Oona
Hathaway, Obama’s Illegal War, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 1, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy
.com/articles/2011/06/01/obamas_illegal_war. See also, Michael N. Schmitt, Wings Over
Libya: The No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 45 (2011).
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United States put itself in a difficult position.  It could no
longer distance itself from the rules and values that it
formulated without paying the political price for this
betrayal.”154
The rhetoric of war is addressed at one and the same time to both
domestic and international audiences.155  In a modern interconnected
world, presidents (and prime ministers) do not operate in isolation.  The
domestic positioning of an administration or a government has distinct
consequences beyond the state’s borders.  The president must carefully
consider the risks as well as the advantages of appealing to the general-
ity, globality, and interconnected nature of any threat that is defined do-
mestically in war terms, as other nations, international institutions, and
even non-state actors reposition themselves in response.  Consider the
usage of the adjective “global” to describe the substantive and geographi-
cal scope of the war on terror.  On the one hand, it seemed to confer
legitimacy on the breadth and scale of the responses to the 9/11 attacks.
By suggesting multilateral action, rather than unilateral operations, the
word “global” informed Americans that they were not alone in the
fight.156  Others saw the cause as just and joined it, much like others did
ten years earlier when the “Coalition of the Willing” joined the United
States in Operation Desert Storm.157  At the same time, the Bush Admin-
istration used the term “global” to put pressure on other governments to
do precisely that—join the United States in the war.158  The war frame
also allowed certain justificatory claims—such as the use of self-defense
claims to justify the war in Iraq—to be more readily available and ac-
ceptable.159  Yet, it also entailed certain legal and political risks.  As we
discuss below, adopting the framework of war may entail direct, swift,
and highly practical legal costs for states especially when contrasted with
actions that do not activate the same legal threshold.  In particular, our
analysis explores the conceptual relationship between the notion of
“emergency” under international human rights law and a state of war
sufficient to overlap with the application of the Geneva Conventions of
1949.160  Our interest lies in better understanding why states choose to
154 PIERRE HAZAN, JUDGING WAR, JUDGING HISTORY: BEHIND TRUTH AND RECONCILIA-
TION 15 (2010).
155 For the idea of two-level games in international relations, see Robert D. Putnam, Di-
plomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
156 GUANT ´ANAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURT AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 20 (Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in & Oren Gross eds., 2013).
157 Daniela V. Dimitrova et al., War on the Web: The Immediate News Framing of Gulf
War II, 10 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 22, 23 (2005).
158 Nı´ Aola´in & Gross, supra note 156, at 20. R
159 Id.
160 An emergency was first defined by the European Court of Human Rights in the Law-
less case as constituting “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the
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accept the status of war or emergency (sometimes simultaneously) and at
other times distinctly avoid such legal and political characterizations.161
The symbolic investiture that follows from the acceptance or denial of
status in international law has rhetorical, symbolic, and communicative
function.
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, relatively little scholarly or policy atten-
tion was given to situations of emergency.162  Emergencies and emer-
gency powers were seen as a backwater of scholarly and policy
interest.163  For the most part, emergencies were frequently considered as
part of the unique experiences of repressive regimes or those with poor
or limited democratic performance and characterized by gross and sys-
tematic human rights violations.  To the extent the emergencies con-
cerned democratic states, they were generally considered to follow an
“ideal,” model form: “Emergency” was considered a sudden, urgent, usu-
ally unforeseen event or situation that required immediate action.164
Thus, the notion of “emergency” was linked inherently to the concept of
“normalcy” in the sense that the former was considered to be outside the
ordinary course of events or anticipated actions.  For the concept of
“emergency” to be meaningful, it had to be understood against the back-
whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the
state is composed”.  Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1961). See also,
Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996); Brannigan v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1993); Brogan
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; and 11386/85, 145 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1988); Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 1 (1978); Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482
(1976); Denmark v. Greece (The Greek Case), App. Nos. 3321/67; 3322/67; 3323/67; and
3344/67, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. 1969); Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
161 Our interest intersects with the puzzle posed by realist international law scholars’ ex-
planations for why states enter into human rights treaties, which are generally based on notions
of reciprocity.  As Cowell points out this explanation is “difficult to balance with the idea of
derogation clauses, as the management of emergency powers at the supranational level is in
many respects an inherent interference with sovereign powers at the national level.”  Frederick
Cowell, Sovereignty and the Question of Derogation: An Analysis of Article 15 of the ECHR
and the Absence of a Derogation Clause in the ACHPR, 1 BIRKBECK L. REV 135, 141 (2013).
162 But see, SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY
(1989); JAIME ORA ´A, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1992); Joan F. Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies—A
Critique of Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1981).
163 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 2 (illustrating the backwater status of emer- R
gency analysis in mainstream constitutional law).
164 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 806 (5th ed. 1993).
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ground of normalcy.  As such, the concept of emergency had to be in-
formed by the twin and interrelated notions of temporariness and
exception.  For normalcy to be “normal,” it had to be the general rule—
the ordinary state of affairs—whereas emergency had to constitute no
more than an exception to that rule.  It must last only a relatively short
time and yield no substantial permanent effects.  Therefore, traditional
discourse on emergency powers posited normalcy and exigency as two
separate phenomena and assumed that emergency was the exception.
Hence, the governing paradigm was that of the “normalcy-rule, emer-
gency-exception.”165  However, state practice amply demonstrates that
the exception has, in fact, become the norm.  Emergencies have rarely
operated in textbook form.  The emergency deviation has become sys-
tematically entrenched in state legal and political systems and culture.
The “ideal emergency” rarely exists.  To wit, a number of consistent
problems have been identified with the practice of emergency powers.166
These include situations of de facto emergency,167 situations of complex
and institutionalized emergency,168 and situations of permanent emer-
gency.169  In all these situations, emergencies went hand in hand with
extraordinary limitations on a broad range of civil and political rights,
producing, in many contexts, systematic and sustained violations of
human rights.
In addition to these historical patterns of abuse or misuse of emer-
gency law and powers, Fenwick and Phillipson have more recently de-
scribed the emergence of a distinctly new category of emergency practice
termed “covert” emergencies.170 In the European democratic context,
the covert emergency includes the subtle persuasion of parliaments and
courts to acquiesce to the “minimal interpretations of certain ECHR
rights that has stripped them of much of their content.  This tactic has the
effect of, at worst, seeking to create effective covert derogations and, at
165 Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437,
440 (1998).
166 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 315–22. R
167 Comm. on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning
Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, 35th Sess., July 27, 1982, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15, § 103, at 26 (Nov. 8, 1982) (a de facto state of emergency arises where
“there is no proclamation or termination of the state of emergency or . . . the state of emer-
gency subsists after it has been officially proclaimed and then terminated.”). .
168 Id. at § 118, at 29.
169 A v. U.K., App. No. 3455/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625 (2009) (The decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in A. and Others v. United Kingdom remarkably holds that
emergencies declared under Article 15 of that Convention can be perpetual).
170 Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference:
Redefining Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism Law and Beyond, 56 MCGILL
L.J. 863, 906 (2011).
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best, of redefining the rights so that they emerged only in a diluted form
in practice.”171 To enable this result, the insidious tactics identified to
advance covert emergencies include simple assurances to parliamentari-
ans that the measures complied with the European Convention on Human
Rights, or, for those more inquiring parliamentarians, a government’s is-
sued assurances that the measures involve only partial minimization of
rights justified by the necessity of the exceptional threat posed by
terrorists.172
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath
brought about a substantial change with respect to the prevalence of
emergency law practice, not so much in the practices of repressive states
or poor quality democracies whose usage of emergency powers remains
broadly consistent with prior patterns, but rather with respect to demo-
cratic states.173  The international legal regimes ushered in by United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1373 and the creation of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee at the United Nations, in conjunction with the Eu-
ropean Union Regulations on Combatting Terrorism,174 have enabled
democratic states to broadly utilize emergency powers, and to do so with
less need for justification or excuse than would previously have been
deemed necessary.  Yet, despite an apparent loosening of the validation
criteria for the activation of emergency powers, democratic states have
made little, if any, use of the formal derogation provisions of interna-
171 Id. at 867.
172 Id. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Human Rights, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parlia
ment.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/ (last vis-
ited on Dec. 24, 2014).  The U.K.’s Joint Committee on Human Rights is the Committee
where government ministers have to answer to, and appear before on, Human Rights issues.
The reports over time reveal that there is a persistent tendency to issue platitudes.  The recent
example of the response to the Government’s new proposed anti-terrorism legislation is a good
one. See The Human Rights Implications of the Justice and Security Green Paper, PARLIA-
MENT.UK (Feb. 01, 2012), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/
joint-select/human-rights-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/justice-and-security-green-pa
per/.
173 This is based on a review of derogation practices and country reporting to the regional
and international human rights bodies (ECHR and UNHRC in particular).  See also a shift in
the literature from human rights review to theorizing and reflection across other legal fields.
Eric Neumayer, Do Governments Mean Business When They Derogate? Human Rights Viola-
tions During Declared States of Emergency, 8 REV. INT’L. ORG. 1 (2013); Christopher Micha-
elsen, Permanent Legal Emergencies and the Derogation Clause in International Human
Rights Treaties: A Contradiction?, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL EMER-
GENCY 287 (Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2012); Tom R. Hickman, Between Human Rights and the
Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism, 68 MOD. L.
REV. 655 (2005); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Emergency and Escape: Explaining Deroga-
tions from Human Rights Treaties, 65 INT’L ORG. 673 (2011).
174 Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in, Balancing Human Rights: International Legal Responses to Ter-
rorism in the Wake of September 11, 33 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 63, 63–66 (2003); Commis-
sion Regulation 1190/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 322/25) (EC). See also Commission Regulation No.
60/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 21/23) (EU).
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tional human rights treaties in the post-9/11 period.175  There has been a
proliferation of exceptional powers practice post-9/11 intertwined with
democratic states avoiding formal acknowledgment of de facto emer-
gency power usage.176  Specifically, states avoid explicit recognition that
additional or layered domestic emergency powers activate derogation re-
sponsibilities under international human rights treaties.177  By deploying
ordinary legislative measures to enact rights-limiting regulation and to
avoid any invocation of exceptionalism in the overt language of emer-
gency regulation, states consistently normalized the exception.178  This is
not to say that the use and abuse of emergency powers by democratic
states has decreased in this period.  Indeed, there is consistent evidence
of a substantial augmentation of emergency laws and emergency admin-
istrative practices.179  The challenge is, in part, explaining why states are
175 On the derogation regime under the various international human rights treaties see, for
example, Gross, supra note 165; Scott P. Sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of Emergency R
Under International Human Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and Politics, 34 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 491, 521 (2013); Alan Green, Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurispru-
dence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1764,
1782–83 (2011).
176 No such declarations have been made to the United Nations or the Council of Europe
except by the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom’s derogation is to be found at: The
Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation), 2001, S.I. 2001/3644 (U.K.), available
at http://www.refworld.org/docid/46e5564f2.html.
177 Aniceto Masferrer, Introduction: Security, Criminal Justice and Human Rights in
Countering Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT
LEGAL EMERGENCY: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 1, 9 (Aniceto
Masferrer ed., 2012) (questioning whether “the derogation clauses remain adequate in an era
of international terrorism.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the vast majority of states did
not invoke derogation clauses in spite of the fact that, in many instances, anti-terrorism legisla-
tion developed to counter the perceived new threat raised serious concerns in relation to their
compatibility with international human rights obligations.  An exception to this trend was the
United Kingdom, which derogated from both the European Convention and the International
Covenant.  These derogations were subsequently challenged in English courts—including the
House of Lords—as well as before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.”).
178 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 228–43; Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National R
Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (2012); DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 17–65 (2006).
179 The post-9/11 derogation landscape has been dominated in Europe by newly estab-
lished democracies.  For example, in the Council of Europe system, Armenia declared a state
of emergency on the city of Yerevan on March 2, 2008 (lifted on March 21, 2008).  The
declared state of emergency allowed Armenia to ban meetings, rallies, and demonstrations; to
ban strikes and other actions that could suspend the activities of organizations; to limit the
freedom of movement of individuals; to allow the means of transportation in the state to be
searched by law enforcement bodies; to limit the operation of the mass media; to ban ‘political
propaganda’; to temporarily suspend the activity of political parties and other public organiza-
tions; to remove persons from a given area those who are deemed to violate the state of emer-
gency or people who do not officially reside in specific areas.  Additionally, on March 2, 2006,
Georgia availed itself of the right of derogation from Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 2 of
Protocol 4 in response to the outbreak of H5N1 (bird flu) in the Khelvachauri district (with-
drawn on March 23, 2006).  This pattern corresponds to Moravcsik’s observation that during
the creation of the ECHR system, newly established democracies has significant interests in
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not making greater use of the available justificatory regime to validate
the use of exceptional powers under international law.  We suggest that a
significant part of the answer lies, once again, with the idea of rhetorical
framing.
As noted above, governments utilize framing to increase public sup-
port for their actions while limiting opposition.180  Governments do this
by manipulating information pertaining both to the magnitude and
probability of potential risks as well as to the costs and benefits of pursu-
ing different measures in response to such risks.181  The choice to define
state action in terms of war, derogation, or “business as usual” is, we
suggest, an important framing moment for states.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administra-
tion embraced the legal language and some, but not all, of the attendant
consequences of operating within a “war” frame.182  Although some
countries initially followed America’s rhetorical lead, numerous demo-
cratic states have shifted away from a “war” frame, showing greater
comfort in the legal and political universe of unacknowledged emer-
gency practice, status, and powers.183  This is not to suggest that the rhet-
oric of “threat” has disappeared.  The vocabulary of terrorism and
counter-terrorism remains ubiquitous in state positioning and continues
to provide justificatory and legitimizing rationales for legislative and ex-
ecutive action.  Nonetheless, the choice to sit in one rhetorical universe
(unacknowledged emergency) over the other (“war”), is not accidental.
It plays out in visible and connected ways within the choice architectures
addressed in Part I.  In many of the same ways, as executive decision
makers seek to communicate with their domestic constituencies (and the
varied constituencies of their allies and foes) as to the strength, vulnera-
bility, resolve, and will of a particular political administration, parallel
bedding down a reciprocity based human rights system based primarily on their own self-
interest. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delega-
tion in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 220 (2000) (arguing that, for some states,
“[e]stablishing an international human rights regime is an act of political delegation akin to
establishing a domestic court or administrative agency”).
180 See text supra Part I.
181 See, Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The
Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 416–18 (1990); MICHAEL STOHL,
WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE AMERICAN CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION AND
REACTION 93–95 (1976); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 482–83 (Paul Slovic et al.
eds., 1982); Paul Slovic, The Affect Heuristic, in INTUITIVE JUDGMENT: HEURISTIC AND BIASES
410–11 (T. Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); see also George Loewenstein & Jane Mather, Dynamic
Processes in Risk Perception, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 155, 161–65 (1990).
182 See text supra Part I.
183 See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 173, at 675–76 (arguing that “stable democracies R
and countries where domestic courts can exercise strong oversight of the executive are more
likely to derogate than other regimes” based their analysis of a comprehensive data sets of
derogations and states of emergency around the world from 1976 to 2007).
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processes come into play as the state positions itself formally vis-a`-vis
other states and international institutions.  As robust state action is man-
dated against terrorist actors and terrorist financiers,184 cooperation and
support to other states in the direct line of (perceived or actual) terrorist
threat has become an important marker of the democratic state’s reliabil-
ity and legitimacy in its inter-state relationships.185  Political and eco-
nomic pressures to demonstrate vigorous backing to counter-terrorism
measures has produced remarkable formal compliance with the reporting
requirements of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee as
184 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  It may be worth recalling the obligations imposed by the Security
Council on UN Member States by way of Res. 1373:
The Security Council . . . Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, 1. Decides that all States shall: (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of
terrorist acts; (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, di-
rectly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention
that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order
to carry out terrorist acts; (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or
economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on
behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities; (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and
entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for
the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in
the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the
direction of such persons; 2. Decides also that all States shall: (a) Refrain from
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in
terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups
and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists; (b) Take the necessary steps to
prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to
other States by exchange of information; (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance,
plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; (d) Prevent those who
finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories
for those purposes against other States or their citizens; (e) Ensure that any person
who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist
acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to
any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious crimi-
nal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects
the seriousness of such terrorist acts; (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relat-
ing to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining
evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings; (g) Prevent the move-
ment of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on
issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for prevent-
ing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.
Id.
185 See Andrei Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-
Terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT. L. 881 (2006).
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well as widespread domestic implementation of Security Council man-
dated obligations into domestic legal orders and a rhetoric of reinforce-
ment to “joined-up” international action on terrorism.186  This is a new
departure in framing collective responses to terrorism, one that demo-
cratic states have been eager to adopt, not least for the reciprocity and
legitimacy benefits that follow.
The expansion of domestic emergency powers derived from and
justified by reference to the obligations that stem from Security Council
(SC) resolutions leaves a number of conceptual gaps,187 not least of
which is the consistent and precise identification of the status of con-
flict(s), which justify such legal action at the national level.  It also leads
to some intriguing questions, including whether “[g]iven the rather ex-
ceptional circumstances that have led the SC to broadly interpret its pow-
ers under Chapter VII . . . [is] the SC itself . . . acting in some sort of
state of emergency”?188
The slippage between war and emergency in national practice mer-
its close scrutiny.189  First, when states are engaged in armed conflict—
whether an “international” armed conflict that is subject to Common Ar-
ticle 2 of the four Geneva Conventions,190 a “non-international” armed
conflict that is subject to Common Article 3,191 or a “transnational non-
international” armed conflict192—there are many pragmatic reasons why
the legal status of their operative framework should be publicly revealed.
There are consequentialist, utilitarian, transparency, and efficiency rea-
sons to call the status of a state as being in a situation of war, state of
emergency, or undeclared emergency at any given point (or as moving
between these positions).  Moreover, clarity on the status of state posi-
186 On the early days and reporting success of the CTC, see Eric Rosand, Security Council
Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM.
J. INT. L. 333 (2003).
187 The named gaps have included the lack of sufficient human rights protections in the
enforcement of these new norms, a view confirmed by the European Court of First Instance in
the cases of Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation, holding that the Security Council “must observe the fundamental peremptory provi-
sions of jus cogens.”  Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R II-3533, at ¶
281; Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-2659, at ¶ 230.
188 Bianchi, supra note 185, at 891. R
189 See Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in, Emergency, War and International Law—
Another Perspective, 70 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 29 (2001).
190 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 150–51 (2008).
191 Id. at 151–56; see also Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the
Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1525 (2007).
192 See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transfor-
mation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War
Governance, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 225, 254–56 (2014); Derek Jinks, September 11 and the
Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003); Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role
for International Law?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 71 (2004).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP201.txt unknown Seq: 33  4-FEB-15 13:13
2014] THE RHETORIC OF WAR 273
tions would shed light on the validity of extending the emergency anal-
ogy to the practice of international institutions such as the United
Nations Security Council.  Second, emergency regimes, formal and in-
formal, afford unexpected latitude to state action both under national
constitutional review and international human rights derogation review
that makes it a paradoxically attractive position to take.193  A state of
emergency may be an appealing option, and not a lesser evil, where the
state’s capacity to maneuver is potentially greater than one would in-
stinctively expect.  A key point of course, is whether the state acknowl-
edges formally the emergency situation and affirms the rights restrictions
that follow by initiating derogation from human rights treaty obligations,
or rather restricts rights with no formal notice to other states with which
it shares treaty obligations.  In both cases, clarity of legal location for the
purposes of evaluating state action and holding the executive responsible
remains an overarching imperative.
Recent empirical analysis of state derogation practices posits the
claim that established democracies derogate precisely because they have
internal compliance constituencies enabling accountability.  However,
we suggest that in practice these constituencies are generally weak and
ineffective.  Rather, it is structural frailty and the variability of oversight
mechanisms that have made derogation attractive to democratic states.194
Moreover, democratic states are generally not derogating.195
193 Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 173, at 673, 675 (claiming that “derogations are a R
rational response to domestic political uncertainty”).
194 A related argument is that emergency and derogations regimes send a signal to voters,
courts, and interest groups that the restrictions on liberties and rights are necessary and lawful
and thus gives the state substantial breathing space.
195 A survey of recent practices by derogating states illustrates that the persistent offend-
ers (namely regularly derogating states) maintain a tenacious presence in formal derogation
notification.  These states generally fall into the category of transitional, fragile, or conflict
afflicted states.  Overall, in 2013, the number of derogations decreased relative to the preced-
ing years, with only two filed—one on January 15 and one on February 27 (specifying deroga-
tion to Article 12).  One derogation has been filed in 2014—on September 24 (specifying
derogation to Articles 12 and 21); Peru, is a serial derogation-filer.  Many if not all of Peru’s
derogations in 2013 and 2014 were notices that a previously-declared state of emergency is
being extended.  In 2013, Peru filed fifteen derogations on seven different dates (March 13,
March 28, May 9, May 30, July 31, October 11, December 5).  Similarly, in 2014, Peru has
thus far filed eleven derogations on four dates (January 28, April 2, June 27, August 11).
These notices list a consistent set of Articles from which Peru is derogating, including 17, 12,
21, 9, and parts of 2.  Guatemala is also a persistent derogator, derogations were current in
2013 and were previously filed in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.  Thailand formally
filed three ICCPR derogations in 2014, on January 28, March 20, and July 8.  The January
derogation declared a state of emergency and specified derogation of ICCPR Articles 12, 19,
and 21.  The March filing was a notice that the state of emergency imposed in January was
lifted.  The last notice, filed in July, specified derogation to Articles 12(1), 14(5), 19, and 21.
See List of Declaration and Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,  https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?
chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
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Separately, we maintain that a state’s resort to the sustained use of
emergency powers may, in certain circumstances, be assessed usefully
through the legal prism of the laws of armed conflict, and not solely
through regular constitutional review or through the derogation provi-
sions of international human rights treaty law.196  We advance this posi-
tion, because sustained emergencies frequently function as “place-
holding” mechanisms to avoid the form of legal and political scrutiny
that might be activated if the international laws of war or domestic, war-
activating constitutional clauses were deemed applicable to the experi-
ence of perpetual crisis.  Moreover, the accountability mechanisms of
these legal regimes vary considerably, emphasizing the practical import
of asking which rules ought to apply in assessing a range of practices
such as rendition, targeted killing, torture, and modified trial.  To state
the obvious, even domestic rules are understood to shift when the law of
armed conflict applies formally, so the issues arise both as an internal
matter within domestic legal systems and at the point of interface be-
tween the domestic and the international.
States of emergency have a tendency to persist, and because they
provide an escape mechanism, they effectively authorize deviant state
behavior precisely when compliance may most be needed.197  The nega-
tive press of the unending “war on terror” has forced a contemporary
rhetorical retreat from the language of war.  As a result, emergencies
may function as an attractive placeholder for legitimizing state practices
of expanding executive and emergency powers in the face of a terrorist
threat.  Sustained emergencies may pose much less of a challenge on the
public relations front and still allow a government or an administration
interested in ratcheting security and supporting liberty-depriving mea-
sures to have a greater capacity to do so.  At the same time, the state of
sustained emergency allows governmental action and measures that are
subject to less judicial and political interference than one might expect.
But there is a fundamental oversight challenge when emergencies are
undeclared or operate informally without derogation from human rights
treaties.  In this universe, states use the terminology of exigency and cri-
sis, deploy rights limiting emergency legislation, and pay none of the
oversight and review costs associated with operating exceptional powers
on a consistent and normalized basis.
196 This is consistent with the empirical findings of Hafner-Burton et al.  Based on their
data set they find that stable democracies derogate for long periods of time when faced with
extreme levels of political violence. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 173, at 676. R
197 Nı´ Aola´in & Gross, supra note 156, at 3–5. R
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A. Reflections on the Emergency Comfort Zone
There is a puzzle inherent in the assertion that states would, with
reflection and foresight, choose to use an emergency framing in their
responses to violent internal challengers or external armed conflict rather
than invoke an armed conflict (war) or business-as-usual framing.  Evi-
dently, the legal status of “emergency” can apply to a substantial number
of economic, social, and political situations.  Understanding state emer-
gency positioning brings us back to storytelling and architecture mo-
tifs.198  Drawing on Giorgio Agamben—who has suggested that against
the backdrop of the “global civil war,” the state of exception is increas-
ingly the “dominant paradigm of government in contemporary polit-
ics”199—it is plausible to conceive of the practice of “emergency” as an
ever-deepening normalization of exceptional measures.200  Permanent
(and derogated) emergencies had become a virtual norm of some states’
practices even before 9/11.201  While in theory derogation measures seem
clear in scope and definition, in practice they allow for an evasion of
robust accountability in complex and challenging ways.202  The source of
accountability for derogation or for the use, misuse, or abuse of emer-
gency powers beyond any domestic constraints lies with the regional
human rights courts and the UN Human Rights Committee.
Undertaking a two-pronged historical analysis, one sees that these
bodies have, in practice, consistently legitimized the democratic state’s
use of emergency powers.  First, focusing on the justification for calling
the emergency, the case law under the European Convention on Human
Rights and its American counterpart has, by and large, upheld states’
drawing on the legitimacy and necessity of particular derogations.203
198 STUCKEY, supra note 25, at 1. R
199 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2 (2005).
200 For an extension of this analysis to an emergency regime for the use of force see Eyal
Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the Management of
Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT. L. 677 (2004) (the state of emergency exception has been
advocated to accommodate the changing demands of the international legal regime for the use
of force within the framework of the UN collective security system).
201 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 228–43. R
202 Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Appli-
cation of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2001).
203 See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 37 (1961); Ireland v. United King-
dom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 107 (1976); Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 89
(2002); Askoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2281 (holding that there was an un-
questionably serious problem of terrorism in south-east Turkey and acknowledging the diffi-
culties for the state in taking measures against it.  On this basis upholding that there was a
“public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”); Sakik v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2609, 2628 (while there is a narrow reading of the scope of the derogation, the core
deference to the state in derogation is maintained); see also Fionnuala Nı´ Aola´in, The Emer-
gence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 101
(1995); Gross, supra note 165. R
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The second step involves close scrutiny of judicial proportionality analy-
sis, most notably as deployed by the European Court of Human
Rights.204  Until the attacks of 9/11, this second prong had allowed the
Court to scrutinize more robustly the actual practice of states coming
before it, often striking down the measures taken by the derogating state
as disproportionate to the threat faced, or articulating a lesser means-to-
ends analysis.205  However, post-9/11, we identify a subtle shift in the
outcomes of proportionality-based analysis, suggesting that it works in-
creasingly to the respondent state’s benefit in determining whether the
measures deployed were proportionate and suitable to the perceived or
actual threat at hand.206  Importantly the proportionality test is being
deployed in cases where there is no formal derogation in place, but the
state advances claims about the broad context of terrorism as necessary
to understand the complexity and contextual implications of its vulnera-
ble position.  This is effectively derogation and sustained emergency by
stealth.  This shift is evident in cases involving non-derogable rights
(specifically torture or inhuman and degrading treatment) as well as spe-
cific derogable rights, such as due process and liberty, in which the very
importation of a weak form of proportionality analysis, allied with perva-
sive references to the challenges of terrorism and exceptionalism broadly
articulated, is weakening the core of the rights under review.  One
scholar has termed this approach an “extra-textual interpretation” by the
European Court of Human Rights.207
The persistent calls for judicial deference to executive action in the
realm of national security operate to undermine or close the interpretative
204 Article 15 of the ECHR sets out that “In time of war or other public emergency threat-
ening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under interna-
tional law.”  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  This has been taken to mean that measures
must thus be strictly proportionate.  In general this has been interpreted to mean that the mea-
sures taken must be strictly required, that the measures must be connected with the emergency,
that the measures should only be used for as long as they are needed, and that the extent to
which the measures deviate from the treaty standards have to be in proportion to the severity of
the threat, and finally that some safeguards should be in place to prevent abuse of such mea-
sures.  See Gross & Nı´ Aola´in, supra note 202. R
205 See e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 at  ¶78; see also McCann and
Others v. the United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶149–50 (1995).
206 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. AF (No 3), [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 A.C. 269
¶33; Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. MB & AF, [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C 440,
484–85, 496–97.
207 See Nicolas A.J. Croquet, The European Court of Human Rights’ Norm-Creation and
Norm-Limiting Processes: Resolving a Normative Tension, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 307, 307
(2011) (“The ECtHR has resorted to an extra-textual interpretation of the ECHR at three dif-
ferent normative phases of human rights reasoning: definition of scope, review of external
limits placed on the exercise of rights not subject to a limitation clause, and review of suspen-
sion measures in case of public emergency.”).
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space open to judges in highly fraught security or terrorism-related
cases.208  In earlier work, we identified a contextual deference approach
by the European Court in the 1993 Brannigan and McBride decision.209
Brannigan was an unusual case coming in the context of a derogation
that had been activated by the United Kingdom in the immediate after-
math of the adverse decision Brogan v. United Kingdom.210  In Brogan,
the absence of a formal derogation meant that the United Kingdom was
found in violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention for detaining an indi-
vidual under section 12(1)(b) and (4) of the 1984 Prevention of Terror-
ism Act beyond the permissible time lines set by the Court.211  Counsel
and supporting amicus briefs to the European Court stressed that the sole
factor that had initiated the derogation was an adverse Court decision,
and not a material change in the circumstances that properly gave rise to
limitations on Article 5.  We argued that in Brogan the blinders evi-
denced by the Court should be understood as uniquely adjusted to the
specificity of the United Kingdom’s position as a leading democratic
state encountering local terrorism difficulties in the 1980s.212  The un-
willingness to address the motives of this state in activating a derogation
and the Court’s passive approach to apparent manipulation of the treaty
regime, we explained by reference to the status and perceived legitimacy
of the United Kingdom in the Council of Europe system.  We viewed
Brogan as a “one-off” case, highly specific to the context and to the
208 A cogent example is found in the House of Lords Belmarsh case, in which the execu-
tive argued that, “as it was for Parliament and the executive to assess the threat facing the
nation, so it was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response necessary to protect
the security of the public.  These were matters . . . calling for an exercise of political and not
judicial judgment.”  A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [37] (appeal
taken from Eng.).  The government position was rejected in Belmarsh, but it has had more
insidious influence elsewhere.  Lord Justice Brooke encapsulated this overly deferential ap-
proach in Belmarsh (CA) when he urged judges to trust the executive more, and
(mis)characterized the insistence on upholding human rights standards as “a purist approach”
that entailed “saying that it is better that this country should be destroyed . . . than that a single
suspected terrorist should be detained without due process.”  A v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2004] QB 335, at ¶ 87 [Belmarsh (CA)], rev’g Belmarsh,.
209 Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 258
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1993); Nı´ Aola´in argues that the way in which the Court inter-
preted “the context of terrorism” in Northern Ireland gave de facto leeway to the UK: “Setting
the balance of discretion in favor of democratic states is directly aided by the use of context
justification.  The context is the subjective assessment of a terrorist or other political threat,
imported into the core of the judicial argument that becomes the base-line from which legal
justifications follow.  The sub-text of this justification is an unwillingness to impute to demo-
cratic states the negation that regularly occurs in respect to rights, in situations where the
government perceives threats to the democratic structure or to public order.”  Nı´ Aola´in, supra
note 203, at 119 (internal citations omitted). R
210 Derogation of the 23 December 1988.
211 Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; and 11386/85,
145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1988).
212 Id.
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respondent State’s status.  Now, it appears that Brogan and the approach
it typifies may not be an aberration at all.  Rather, the contextual defer-
ence motif is making a more sustained appearance in non-derogation
cases, especially those involving due process rights, where invocations
and appeals to the scourge of terrorism operate as a means to contextual-
ize the contemporary interpretation of these rights.213  As Fenwick and
Phillipson illustrate, judicial outcomes are also shaped by prior legisla-
tive interaction where the government has preemptively sought to under-
mine liberty leaning protections, “by exploiting any ambiguities in the
interpretation of ECHR rights so as to produce the most executive-
friendly reading of them possible.  In general, such tactics become possi-
ble due to the febrile atmosphere typically generated by government
claims that we are in a semi-permanent state of emergency.”214
More broadly, after 9/11 the metaphor of “balancing” between se-
curity and human rights or liberty has been used widely to reduce the
effect and curtail the capacity of human rights based claims.215  For nihil-
ists and realists alike, 9/11 opened an opportunity to reduce law to re-
present one “view” that could be overruled by an opinion sought from
other fields of expertise.  Such an approach to “balancing” resulted in the
undermining of absolute, non-derogable human rights, in accepting intru-
sions into the essential core of other human rights, and in a reordering of
values so that security would always trump human rights.  The language
of robust protection of human rights has been replaced by rhetoric of
balancing.  Nowhere was this transformation more pernicious than in the
context of non-derogable rights.  As we argued elsewhere, when faced
with violent states of emergency, public officials are likely to be unable
to assess accurately the risks facing the nation.  In those circumstances
an act of balancing between security and liberty—of optimizing the
trade-off between the two—is likely to be biased.  The pressures exerted
by acute exigencies on decision-makers (and the public at large), coupled
with certain unique features of crisis mentality and thinking, are likely to
result in a systematic undervaluation of one interest (liberty) and overval-
213 An example cited by Fenwick and Phillipson is Lord Hoffmann’s of the House of
Lords.  In one significant decision on Article 5 of the ECHR he wrote: “The liberty of the
subject and the right to habeas corpus are too precious to be sacrificed for any reason other
than to safeguard the survival of the state.  But one can only maintain this position if one
confines the concept of deprivation of liberty to actual imprisonment or something which is for
practical purposes little different from imprisonment.  Otherwise the law would place too great
a restriction on the powers of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats to the lives of its
citizens.”  Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [44] (appeal taken from
Eng.); Fenwick & Phillipson, supra note 170, at 870. R
214 Fenwick & Phillipson, supra note 170, at 868. R
215 Gross, supra note 98, at 45; Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of R
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Human Rights Coun-
cil, ¶ 47 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin).
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uation of another (security) so that the ensuing balance would be tilted in
favor of security concerns at the expense of individual rights and
liberties.216
Underlining the shift away from derogation mechanisms and rheto-
ric is the empirical reality that only one democratic state has derogated
under its international human rights treaty obligations since 9/11.217  The
United Kingdom entered a substantial derogation after the events of 9/11
under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.218
Whatever the perceived merits of derogation framing, it is debatable
what tangible leeway this derogation subsequently gave the United King-
dom.  It is reasonable to assume that a formal derogation brought greater
attention to the practices of the United Kingdom as the one democratic
state in derogation,219 and that it became a lightning rod for the cries of
foul play.  One lesson from the British choice to frame the situation as a
public emergency that justified resort to derogation, and the criticism
directed at the U.K. government as a result, is simply not to derogate
formally from human rights treaty obligations and avoid ceding the nar-
rative space to the formalized exception.  Rather, the working principle
might well be that the maintenance of emergency powers is, by and
large, not dependent on derogation, as evidenced by the 2000 Crime Act
216 Gross, supra note 98. R
217 See Andrej Zwitter, Annajorien Prins & Hannah Pannwitz, State of Emergency Map-
ping Database (2014) (University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper Series), avail-
able at http://emergencymapping.org/onewebmedia/140423%20-%20STEM%20Working%20
Paper.pdf. See id. at 8 (“The data shows that a high number of states of emergency are de-
clared in Latin American countries.  Whereas there are a vast number of countries that have
declared and exercised emergency powers across the world throughout the period of 1998-
2013, it is only a relatively small number of countries that have reported their states of emer-
gency and related human rights derogations to the United Nations.”).  The mapping exercise
goes on to confirm that, “Other than Peru and Guatemala, there are 17 different countries that
have reported states of emergency with human rights derogations to the United Nations over
the 15-year period.  These are: Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
France, Georgia, Jamaica, Namibia, Nepal, Paraguay, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Most of these countries have only reported a state of
emergency declaration with human rights derogations once or twice to the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral.  The only country that has reported more frequently than once or twice is Ecuador.” Id. at
9 n.13.
218 List of Declarations Made by the United Kingdom Regarding the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL EUR. TREATY OFF. (Oct.
29, 2014), http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?PO=UK&
NT=005&MA=999&CV=1&NA=&CN=999&VL=1&CM=5&CL=ENG.
219 JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (SEVENTEENTH REPORT): BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS BACK IN, 2009–10, H.L. 86, H.C.
111, at 7–8 (U.K.) (see in particular paragraphs 11 and 12, where the Parliamentary Commit-
tee disputes the executive’s assertion that the conditions exist sufficient to claim a state of
emergency relying on the assessment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC)).
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in the United Kingdom.220  Essentially, the “work” can get done in other
ways.221  The normalization frame is now well in place.
The production of legislation that is emergency-driven in character,
but framed formally as ordinary, continues unabated.222  Democracies
such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada,223 Germany,224
and Australia225 have enacted substantial and far-reaching legislation
aimed at containing terrorist or national security threats and virtually all
of it has been marshaled through the ordinary criminal law.226  The most
cogent example of this phenomenon is the conversion in the United
Kingdom of decades of exceptional emergency legislation including the
Emergency Powers Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Acts into con-
solidated “ordinary” U.K. wide legislation at the ending phase of the
conflict in Northern Ireland.227  We are witnessing “the subversion of
legal norms to counter-insurgency ends.”228  A perilous articulation of
this view is found in the oft-quoted statement by General Frank Kitson
(who served a key military role in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s):
220 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.).
221 There is historical evidence in the United Kingdom for this assertion too.  For exam-
ple, the Special Powers Act 1922 (modeled after the Defence of the Realm Act and the Resto-
ration of Order in Ireland Act 1920), while initially an exceptional piece of legislation was
eventually made permanent in 1933.  It is also significant to note that the “sovereignty cost” of
delegation is not as high as we might think. But see, Moravcsik supra note 179, at 227 (“[A]ll R
other things equal, the ‘sovereignty cost’ of delegating to an international judge is likely to be
even greater than that of delegating to a domestic judge.”).  As our earlier studies of interna-
tional judicial practice have illustrated, it is not evident that these symbolic or sovereignty
costs are particularly high for a consolidated democracy. See generally, Nı´ Aola´in & Gross,
supra note 202; Nı´ Aola´in, supra note 203. R
222 GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 66–67. R
223 PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY: CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY (2004); see also KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA (2003).
224 Germany’s post 9/11 anti-terror legislation amends and extends previous legislation.
See Arne Lichtenberg, Germany’s Anti-Terror Law, 10 Years On, DW.DE (Sept. 1, 2012),
http://www.dw.de/germanys-anti-terror-law-10-years-on/a-15654829.
225 Since 9/11, Australian states have passed a number of laws authorizing temporary
emergency powers. See, e.g., Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006, (Austl.
Cap. Terr.) (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2006-21/current/pdf/
2006-21.pdf; Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2003 (N. Terr.) (Austl.), available at http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/tpa323/; Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002
(N.S.W.) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/tpa2002291/.
226 See, e.g., Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.); Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of
Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The Post 9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International
State of Emergency, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
227 The legislation included the Terrorism Act (2000), the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Se-
curity Act (2001), the Criminal Justice Act (2003), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), the
Terrorism Act (2006), the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006, and the Counter-
Terrorism Act (2008).
228 See, e.g., Mark McGovern, The Dilemma of Democracy: Collusion and the State of
Exception, 2 STUD. SOC. JUST. 213, 223 (2011).
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[T]he [l]aw should be used as just another weapon in the
government’s arsenal, and in this case it becomes little
more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of un-
wanted members of the public.  For this to happen effi-
ciently, the activities of the legal services have to be tied
into the war effort in as discreet a way as possible.229
Any analysis of emergency practice should be attuned to “creation
of zones of in-distinction in contemporary institutions, where the formal
normative order is adapted, misshaped, subverted, and/or suspended.”230
There is substantial evidence of the necessity of preserving the appear-
ance of constitutional “normalcy,” particularly in well established de-
mocracies.231  This occurs, in part, by governmental attention to the
framing of the exception and greater sophistication in weaving a narra-
tive that affirms threats but avoids legal forms that may limit the maneu-
verability of the Executive.  The ordinariness of emergency law and
practice absorbed into the post-9/11 juridico-institutional order rational-
izes and maintains the legitimacy of the democratic order and its normal-
yet-exceptional functioning, rather than exposing it for what it is.
B. Framing: The Retreat from the Rhetoric and Formalities of
“War”
As noted above, individuals use frames as interpretive emotional
filters through which they make sense of surrounding events and
messages.  States engage in a similar kind of action.
Despite the prominence of “War on Terror” rhetoric post-9/11, dem-
ocratic states’ flirtation with the status of being “at war” has been, as a
formal matter, a rather short-lived affair.  The lexicon of legal engage-
ment with terrorist organizations and non-state actors of various types in
various locations has changed noticeably over time, sometimes with little
advance notice of the vocabulary shifts and the legal consequences that
follow.  For instance, the United States and its allies speedily made
moves to avoid the appearance that law of occupation obligations may
apply to their involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan.232  In other con-
texts, the language, rhetoric, and regulation of derogation and armed con-
229 FRANK KITSON, LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY AND
PEACEKEEPING 69 (1971).
230 McGovern, supra note 228, at 227. R
231 Id.
232 See Siobha´n Wills, The Obligations Due to Former ‘Protected Persons’ in Conflicts
that Have Ceased to Be International: The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran, 15 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 117, 118–20 (2010); see generally Adam Roberts, Transformative Mili-
tary Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580
(2006); Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 27 (2005).
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flict have been abandoned, or not assumed initially, leaving it to
“ordinary” law to “do the work.”
Once again, that assertion is partly sustained by the absorption of
exceptional legal norms addressing terrorism and counter-terrorism into
the ordinary legal regimes of many states.233  Thus, for democratic states,
submerging de facto emergency practices into ordinary law and rhetoric
are deemed more attractive as framing devices to state action than the
resort to a “law of war” framing and practice.  At the same time, signifi-
cant overlap exists between emergency and armed conflict legal regimes,
and shifts between these two frameworks can and do occur over time.
Eventually both can, and do, impact the ordinary legal terrain in insidi-
ous ways.
While it is likely that some states will maintain emergencies and
resort to the legal regime of derogation as a means to cover regime ille-
gitimacy, this is not the case for most.  For consolidated democracies
managing internal armed conflict, emergency framing serves multiple
purposes.  These include legitimacy, flexibility, and control to strengthen
and extend executive powers in ways much less likely to garner defeat-
ing scrutiny than might be the case under overt declaration of armed
conflict.234  We are not suggesting that emergency regimes do not enter-
tain domestic and external scrutiny; they clearly do.  However, the ro-
bustness and effectiveness of such scrutiny is limited in crucial ways,
thereby giving the democratic state more substantial leeway under emer-
gency frameworks domestically and internationally than might be the
case in other legal frames.235  Derogations do not make national or inter-
national newspaper headlines, nor do they engage the general public,
civil society, and interested outsiders in sustained preoccupation with the
233 See generally Dermot P.J. Walsh, The Impact of the Antisubversive Laws on Police
Powers and Practices in Ireland: The Silent Erosion of Individual Freedom, 62 TEMP. L. REV.
1099 (1989); Alan Dowty, The Use of Emergency Powers in Israel, 21 MIDDLE EAST REV. 34
(1988); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES (2003); Jason Collins Weida, A Repub-
lic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397 (2004);
David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of
Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003).
234 Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Interface of National Constitutional Systems with Interna-
tional Law and Institutions on Using Military Forces: Changing Trends in Executive and
Legislative Powers, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 39 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2003) (providing a comparative
assessment of increasing parliamentary and democracy infusions in the use of war powers by
democratic states.  While this aptly noted phenomena is important to an analysis of democratic
control over the exertion of war enabling powers, this move may also provide one explanatory
dimension to the unwillingness of executives to resort to the usage of war powers ab initio
because there are veto and compromise costs involved).
235 But see Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
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activities of the state: declarations of war and engagement of military
forces guarantee a level of interest and scrutiny for the state which is
invariably significant and intrusive.  Ordinarily, courts closely scrutinize
restrictions on constitutional and human rights.  However, when a state
of emergency is declared, judicial attitudes shift.236  There is some dis-
pute as to whether that shift is sustained the longer the emergency
lasts.237  However, evidence of judicial practice across jurisdictions is at
the very least mixed, so states can make reasonable bets as to the inten-
sity and effectiveness of that scrutiny even over the life of a sustained
emergency tilting in their favor.
An established international relations literature broadly acknowl-
edges that democratic states are much less likely to seek military conflict,
at least amongst themselves, or to mediate intra-state disputes through a
resort to force.238  However, when democracies engage in international
armed conflicts, a number of factors influence whether such conflicts are
classified as inter-state engagements or the more complex intersection of
state and non-state actors.  These include the pressure for democracies to
end speedily such engagements, the lack of tolerance by democratic poli-
ties for significant loss of civilian or combatant lives,239 and the trans-
parency pressures that are more likely to be placed on the executive in its
oversight and war management.
In 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the United States launched a
war against Afghanistan.  The full force of the Geneva Conventions ap-
plied to this war, notwithstanding the fact that the United States had pre-
viously refused diplomatic recognition to the Taliban-controlled Afghani
government.240  In parallel, emergency language and invocation was part
236 See GROSS & N´I AOL ´AIN, supra note 62, at 72–79. R
237 See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SE-
CURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007).
238 See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 179, at 224 (asserting that “governments support R
human rights regimes to advance partisan and public interest in preventing domestic violence
and interstate warfare”).  On the idea of “democratic peace” see, e.g., PATHS TO PEACE: IS
DEMOCRACY THE ANSWER? (Miriam F. Elman ed., 1997) (providing case studies of the demo-
cratic peace hypothesis); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR
A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993) (establishing the democratic peace theory); Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 382–83 (1998) (providing context for
the democratic peace theory in liberal international relations theory). See generally THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 195–98 (1999) (referring to a globalized “Mc-
Donald’s” world with a “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Avoidance”).
239 This can also be read as a compliance pressure for democratic states to laws of war
adherence.  On compliance to laws of war, see generally James D. Morrow, The Laws of War,
Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S41
(2002).
240 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30588, AFGHANISTAN: POST-
TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY 5–6, 43 (2014).
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of the rhetoric of the moment.241  Thus, on September 14, 2001, the Pres-
ident declared a national emergency “by reason of the terrorist attacks at
the World Trade Center . . . and the Pentagon, and the continuing and
immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.”242  President
Bush renewed the declaration of a state of national emergency in every
subsequent year of his presidency.  The initial response of the interna-
tional human rights community was an insistence that the terrorist acts of
9/11 were serious crimes and ought to be handled within a law enforce-
ment paradigm.243  Gradually, however, academics and international
human rights actors have become more willing to concede that despite a
preference for many of operating within a law enforcement paradigm,
there is an undeniable need to accept that there may be overlap between
law enforcement models and the law of armed conflict.244  Such overlaps
are not necessarily of unlimited duration, rather, there may be temporal,
geographical, and actor specificity to the continuities and discontinuities
of these two legal regimes. Parsing out the degree to which state posi-
tioning, pragmatism, and even enlightened self-interest have motivated
the partial shift, there can be little doubt that the initial definitive
privileging of the armed conflict narrative has been at least partly respon-
sible for the shift beyond state framing.
Eventually, presidential awareness of the constitutive power of lan-
guage and framing led the Obama Administration to forego the use of the
war frame in two contexts.  News reports in March 2009 indicated that
the Administration decided to drop the term “Global War on Terror”
from its lexicon, although some reports suggested that it was to be re-
placed by yet another euphemism: “Overseas Contingency Opera-
tion.”245  Similarly, on May 13, 2009, the Director of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy announced that the new administration
would no longer use the term “War on Drugs,” noting that the term was
counter-productive and contrary to the Administration’s policy of favor-
241 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at ix (2009) (noting that an “endless war, and an endless emergency” were in sight).
242 Proclamation No. 7463: Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Terrorist Attacks, 3. C.F.R. 7463 (Sept. 14, 2001).
243 United Nations: Responding to Sept. 11: General Assembly Urged to Use Human
Rights As Basis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/news/2001/09/30/
united-nations-responding-sept-11.
244 See JONATHAN R. WHITE, DEFENDING THE HOMELAND: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND SECURITY (2004); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2002); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions
and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345 (2002).
245 Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST,
Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR200903
2402818.html.
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ing treatment over incarceration.246  While studiously avoiding President
Bush’s refrain of “War on Terror,” the Obama Administration has re-
peatedly declared that the United States is “at war against [A]l
Qaeda.”247  President Obama has similarly maintained the emergency
declaration initiated by President Bush, noting that, “[t]he terrorist threat
that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emer-
gency continues.  For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary
to continue in effect . . . the national emergency with respect to the ter-
rorist threat.”248
If commentators are to probe more fulsomely the preferred framing
of executive leaders to address, as a legal matter, the precise linkage
between permanent emergencies, derogation, and international armed
conflict, then the treaty language of the derogation provisions should
bear greater scrutiny.  As our pre- and post-9/11 data demonstrates, states
engaged in armed conflicts (internal or external) generally do not utilize
derogation to proclaim their involvement in hostilities.249  States see no
necessary need for derogation, as they assume that the application of the
law of war is a de facto ouster of human rights law or that the ordinary
law of the land can adapt in times of war, thereby excluding the need for
derogation.250
Shared understandings of unacceptable conduct, which are central
to compliance in the laws of war arena, may pose unexpected costs to
democratic states.  These costs may, in turn, result in states attempting to
move out of law of war regulation to other legal areas.  Such a move
might create a type of forum shopping for democracies engaged in armed
conflict that incentivizes regulation under an emergency framework
(preferably in one perspective a de facto emergency framework), rather
246 Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to “War on Drugs,” WALL ST. J., May
14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124225891527617397.
247 See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Strength-
ening Intelligence and Aviation Security (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-security (“We
are at war.  We are at war with [A]l Qaeda, a far reaching network of violence and hatred that
attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us
again.”).
248 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Message from the President to Congress Re-
garding the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks
(Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/11/mes
sage-continuation-national-emergency-respect-certain-terrorist-attack.
249 See text supra Part II.
250 Nonetheless, some human rights treaties, including Article 15 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, specifically allows derogation for a situation of war.  Note that
while arguing in favor of the ICCPR’s derogation clause in 1947, the U.K. emphasized that
“under general international law in time of war States were not strictly bound by conventional
obligations unless the conventions contained provisions to the contrary.”  Hafner-Burton et al.,
supra note 173, at 676. R
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than a laws-of-war framework.251  Unexpected costs for states may in-
clude the practical realities of enforcing accountability for violations of
the law of armed conflict at the domestic level and for treaty breaches
when the democratic state is embroiled in conflict with non-state ac-
tors—a situation that weakens the reciprocal legitimacy that aids en-
forcement of norms at the national level.  Arguably, asymmetric
information about the state’s adversary or common knowledge about
compliance may affect substantially the state’s willingness to play the
game according to these rules, notwithstanding that a doctrinal legal
analysis would suggest that the appropriate regulatory arena is the law of
war.
Finally, as Morrow notes, “[r]atification . . . can operate as a screen
on the intentions of states to observe the standards of a treaty.”252  We
should take seriously the claim that democratic states ratify humanitarian
law treaties but “screen” rather than “signal” in their decisions to observe
those treaties in the midst of active armed conflict.  In terms of the com-
pliance puzzle, a move to the non-utilization of formal derogation may
not necessarily portend the triumph of realism over idealism, but rather
point to micro-adjustments to states’ framing of their responses to human
rights obligations.  This move occurs in a universe where human rights
norms have been deeply embedded in the practices and identity projec-
tions of consolidated democracies.  Governments remain staunchly com-
mitted to the rhetorical ideal of human rights and exercise significant
resources to coerce or persuade others to accept human rights norms.
However, the challenges emanating from ongoing internal or external
conflict create deep zones of regulatory discomfort and generate a state
desire for greater operational latitude.  Hence, a certain twilight zone of
emergency practice, informally sustained and woven into the ordinary
law instead of being marked and cordoned off as exceptional becomes
attractive.  Moreover, state responses track an emergent move from
counter-terrorism to criminal justice management.253
A number of factors compound the lack of recognition by legal
commentators for the slippage and interplay between legal regimes.
First, the emergency oversight mechanisms created by treaty law are
grossly inadequate to confront the complexity of emergencies them-
selves.  Looking to the drafting history of regional and international
human rights instruments, the working assumption of drafters and state
251 Drawing on Morrow, supra note 239, at S43, the challenges shared understanding may R
lie with state understanding of the “appropriate standard of conduct, reciprocal enforcement
when states cannot completely observe the causes of violations, and the need for agreements to
cooperate at the individual level as well as at the state level.”
252 Id. at S49.
253 See Mike Tomlinson, From Counter-Terrorism to Criminal Justice: Transformation
or Business as Usual?, 51 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 442 (2012).
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parties was that “emergencies” would be short-lived and inconsequential
affairs.  What the instruments themselves failed to anticipate, and the
oversight bodies proved inept at otherwise containing, was the practice
of sustained emergencies by states.  National legal systems proved no
less robust in challenging and redirecting state practices with respect to
the sustained resort to emergency powers.  The very complexity of emer-
gency practices by states proved a challenge to the oversight capacity of
states and international instruments, conceptually and practically cloud-
ing their ability to “think outside the emergency box” and address the
range of other potential legal regimes.
Second, with a focus on human rights protection in the context of
emergency (where in fact much of the challenge to state action occurs),
all actors in the human rights drama—such as the Human Rights Com-
mittee, the European Court (and, in the past, Commission) of Human
Rights, the Inter-American Court and Commission, and the Human
Rights Council—are concerned with the regulation of state action within
their respective spheres of influence.  For the majority of these bodies, it
was perceived as inappropriate to shift their examination of certain emer-
gency situations to include humanitarian law terms of reference or to
hypothesize that such consideration would best or mutually be consid-
ered within the human rights framework.  Relatedly, the human rights
regime remains generally unwilling, both conceptually and politically, to
recognize within its own boundaries the validation of another phenome-
non, i.e., armed conflict, which is regarded by some as anathema to the
very application of human rights, or at the very least, as dislodging the
primacy of human rights norms by claims of lex specialis.254  The Inter-
American Court and Commission have shown greater capacity in this
regard than the European Court (and previously Commission), which de-
spite a plethora of cases from Chechnya, South-East Turkey, and previ-
ously from Northern Ireland, found it exceptionally difficult to “call” the
overlap between humanitarian law application and the human rights re-
gime.255  For the ECHR in particular this results from the bi-polar
splintering of legal conceptions of war and peace, allowing little shared
ground in-between and creating ambiguities for states seeking “wiggle”
room from which to benefit.
254 Institutionally the OHCHR has moved to seek greater interface over time between the
human rights infrastructure and the counter-terrorism infrastructure post-9/11. See U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism: Study of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/59/428 (Oct, 8 2004). But see Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War
Against Terrorism and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 241, 247–60 (2003) (arguing that
after 9/11 a reconceptualization of counter-terrorism as international armed conflict may dis-
place human rights laws and international criminal law may develop).
255 See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L./V/
II.116, (Oct. 22, 2002).
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Third, the fluidity of regimes creates uncertainty for governments,
who have little interest in seeking international consensus for recognition
of status that may undermine their own stability and capacity to respond
when under siege.256  Thus, states are likely to maintain and encourage
the status quo on distinct regimes with all the limitations outlined above
and benefit directly from the gray zones that follow.  Hence, the juridical
nexus between the humanitarian law of internal armed conflict and the
emergency exception of human rights remains an uncharted area that
leaves a very particular space to the state to frame its response to crisis in
state-affirming ways.  This is not to belie the substantial work undertaken
by jurists and scholars in charting the relationship between international
human rights and humanitarian law generally framed.257  For example, in
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on The Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, the Court stated that: “[T]he Court considers that the protec-
tion offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed
conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind
to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights.”258
There is substantial analysis and mapping in the micro-space be-
tween emergency and the threshold application of the law of armed con-
flict still do be done.  Specifically, the relationship between an available
repertoire of framing designations and a broader set of narrative manage-
ment forged by governments, administrations, and even non-state actors,
deserves greater concerted analysis and understanding.  Both armed con-
flict and emergency status are significant conceptual categories in their
own right, invested with state interest and containing external symbols of
meaning.  Both “boxes” are important categories that affect the status
and legitimacy of state and non-state actors engaged in conflict or crisis.
It matters to states that they exercise control over the definition and ap-
plication of these categories when they are experiencing war and/or exi-
gency of a serious kind.  The intensity of state investment in framing
explains in part why states work so hard in trying to control the designa-
tion that applies to them.  This happens because both emergency and
armed conflict are legal categories that have a significant universe of
obligation, each posing distinct and separate duties on states and other
actors.  In this universe of obligation the consequences of accountability,
256 For an interesting proposal that seeks to exploit the overlaps between both regimes,
see Tom Hadden & Colin Harvey, The Law of Internal Crisis and Conflict, 81 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 119 (1999).
257 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L
L. 239 (2000).
258 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ries, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9).
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transparency, and exposure are all real risks for states, and so they have a
vested interest in damage limitation as well as in presenting the best pro-
jection of the state’s actions and interests.  This partly clarifies the active
hostility to any whiff of interference with executive judgments on the
status of conflict within or between states and in the selection of lan-
guage used to signal a zone of exclusion to the legal and political space
of framing.
CONCLUSION
One important element of information processing and analysis is the
time needed to investigate consequences and alternatives.  As “cognitive
misers,” as Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor famously put it, individuals
utilize shortcuts in order to minimize the effort and time involved in
processing information to make decisions as expediently and painlessly
as possible.259  Moments of great consternation and upheaval, such as
those the imagery of war and violent crisis invokes, which are character-
ized by sudden, urgent, and often unforeseen events or situations that
require immediate action, accentuate the problems related to our ability
to process information and evaluate complex situations.  Hence, such cri-
ses tend to lead to an even greater reliance on heuristics as a means of
countering the lack of sufficient time to properly evaluate the situation.
At the same time, reliance on framing as a shortcut also means that who-
ever manages to control the framing of information would greatly influ-
ence, and could manipulate how recipients interpret the information.260
In the universe of reliance and shortcuts, executive enunciations to
their domestic constituencies and state framing vis-a`-vis other states have
much in common.  Both constitute central elements of making and un-
making the legal universe.  This Article exhorts those concerned with the
modalities of exceptionality and crisis in law to pay particular attention
to how the Executive Branch and governments shift their framing of
emergencies over time and to remain deeply attuned to the influences
such articulation may have on the legal status of conflict and crisis.  One
core concern in this analysis has been the extent to which “saying” be-
comes the stand-in for formal and informal understandings of applicable
legal regimes and facilitates slippage in oversight and accountability for
the exercise of exceptional powers in situations that are rhetorically iden-
tified as crises.  Critical attention to the heuristics of framing and the
reception of knowledge in times of exigency may not undo the shortcuts,
but it does make us more firmly aware of the slippage points.
259 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 13. R
260 See Schwartz, supra note 36. R
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